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Glossae on the New Law of Filiation
J.-R. Trahan*
Through the enactment of Act 192 of 2005 ("2005 Act 192"),
effective June 29, 2005, and Act 344 of 2006 ("2006 Act 344"), effective
June 13, 2006, the Louisiana Legislature comprehensively revised those
parts of Louisiana's legislation that establish the law of "filiation by
nature"'-Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of Title VII of Book I of the Civil Code as
well as the correlative Civil Code Ancillaries. Like nearly all (indeed, all
but one2) of the "comprehensive revisions" of the Civil Code that have
been accomplished over the last three decades, this one ("Revision")
grew out of the work of the Louisiana State Law Institute ("Institute"),
more precisely, its Persons Committee ("Committee"). 3  Though the
Committee had produced but a single projet ("Projet") for the Revision,
the Projet, for reasons of legislative strategy, was later split into two
parts, the first of which consisted of the proposed revisions to the Civil
Code and the second of which consisted of the proposed revisions to the
Civil Code Ancillaries. The former formed the basis for 2005 Act 192;
the latter, the basis for 2006 Act 344.4
My aim in this article is to present to the reader the revised Civil
Code articles and the most important of the revised Civil Code
Ancillaries, with a view to assisting him in understanding how this new
legislation does and does not "change the law." To this end, I shall
follow a format for the presentation of revisions to the Civil Code that
Dean Symeon Symeonides pioneered some years back and that I have
since then followed, 5 namely, that of (1) visually juxtaposing the texts of
the new and old legislation, and (2) "glossing" (footnoting) the text of
the old legislation or that of the new legislation, as might be appropriate,
to signal what has been changed and what has not. In referring to the old
and new legislation, I shall, following the practice first established by
Dean Symeonides, use the abbreviations "OA" (old article) and "NA"
(new article), respectively.
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* James Carville Alumni Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert
Law Center, Louisiana State University.
** The Board of Editors of the Louisiana Law Review has relaxed its rules
of citation to enhance the readability of Professor Trahan's in-depth analysis of
the new law of filiation. Additionally, like previous scholarship by Professor
Trahan, this article features citations to numerous sources of foreign law.
Unless otherwise indicated, the translations of those sources are his own.
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1. Filiation is defined as "the [juridical] line that unites a child to his father
or to his mother: to his father, paternal filiation or paternity; to his mother,
maternal filiation or maternity." Gerard Cornu, DROIT CIVIL: LA FAMILLE No.
195, at 313 (7th ed. 2001); see also Francesco Messineo, 2 MANUALE DI
DIRITro CIVILEE COMMERCIALE: DIRITrI DELLA PERSONALITA, DRiTrl DELLA
FAMIGLIA, DIRTI REALI § 62, No. 1, at 145 (9th ed. 1965) ("Filiation is the
[juridical] relation that exists between the progeny and the progenitor (or
progenitors), by virtue of which the former is called the child of the latter ....
that is, whereby the status of child is attributed to him and he acquires the rights
(in addition to being the subject of the duties) that are inherent in this status.
The relation of filiation is symmetrical with that of paternity and, respectively,
that of maternity, by virtue of which the progenitor acquires the status of father
or mother of the progeny."); Eduardo A. Zannoni, 2 DERECHO CIVIL: DERECHO
DE FAMILIA § 793, at 283 (2d ed. 1989) ("The term 'filiation'-from the Latin
filius, son-signifies the conjunction of juridical relations, determined by
paternity and by maternity, that bind parents to their children within the
family."); Caio MArio da Silva Pereira, 5 INSTITUI(;OES DE DIREITO CIVIL:
DIREITO DE FAMiLLA No. 410, at 173-74 (7th ed. 1991) ("[F]iliation is the
juridical relation that ties the child to his parents. It is established between
persons one of whom descends from the other and is considered as filiation
properly so called when seen from the side of the child; conversely, considered
from the side of the father, it is called 'paternity' and from that of the mother,
'maternity."').
Two different kinds of filiation can be distinguished. See generally Jean
Carbonnier, DROIT CIVIL: LA FAMILLE: L'ENFANT, LE COUPLE 181-82 (20th ed.
1999) (distinguishing filiation "according to the flesh" from adoptive filiation);
DROIT DE LA FAMILLE No. 1193, at 387 (Jacqueline Rubellin-Devichi dir., 1999)
(distinguishing filiation "by procreation" from adoptive filiation). First, there is
filiation "by nature." This kind of filiation arises by virtue of an actual or
presumed biological relationship between the parent and the child, namely, the
relationship of progenitor and progeny. See Cornu, supra, No. 198, at 315.
Second, there is filiation "by law." This kind of filiation, sometimes also called
"adoptive" filiation, for it requires an act and a judgment of adoption, "arises
from the legislative will to create something identical to this [natural] filial line
so as to attach the adopted child to an individual or to the spouses that the law
institutes as parent(s)." DROIT DE LA FAMILLE, supra, No. 1194, at 389.
The literature on the law of filiation is abundant. That, in Louisiana,
includes the following: Christopher L. Blakesley, PARENT AND CHILD §§ 5.01-
5.21, in LOUIsIANA FAMILY LAW 5-1-5-38 (1997); Sandi Varnado, Comment,
Who's Your Daddy?: A Legitimate Question Given Louisiana's Lack of
Legislation Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 66 LA. L. REV. 609
(2006); June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the
Core of Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295 (2005); Brianne M. Star,
Comment, A Matter of Life and Death: Posthumous Conception, 64 LA. L. REV.
613 (2004); Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Law Tradition:
Archaic or Prophetic in the Twenty-First Century?, 63 LA. L. REV. 1, 13-19
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(2002); Jean-Louis Baudouin, Science, Ethics and Civil Law, 61 LA. L. REV.
423, 425-26 (2001); Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Pushing the Boundaries: An
Interdisciplinary Examination of New Reproductive Technologies: The Process
of Regulating Assisted Reproductive Technologies: What We Can Learn from
Our Neighbors-What Translates and What Does Not, 45 LoY. L. REV. 247
(1999); Christopher L. Blakesley, Scientific Testing and Proof of Paternity:
Some Controversy and Key Issues for Family Law Counsel, 57 LA. L. REV. 379
(1997); Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Successions and Donations: From Cradle to
Tomb: Estate Planning Considerations of the New Procreation, 57 LA. L. REV.
27 (1996); Ellen J. Garside, Comment, Posthumous Progeny: A Proposed
Resolution to the Dilemma of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 41 LoY. L.
REV. 713 (1996); Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Roman Sources and Constitutional
Mandates: The Alpha and Omega of Louisiana Laws on Concubinage and
Natural Children, 56 LA. L. REv. 317, 326-31, 333-35 (1995); J.E. Cullins, Jr.,
Note, Should the Legitimate Child Be Forced to Pay for the Sins of Her
Father?: Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 53 LA. L. REV. 1675 (1993); Dee
O'Neil Andrews, Comment, DNA and Dads: Considerations for Louisiana in
Using DNA Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, 38 LoY. L. REV. 425 (1992);
Timothy S. Cragin, Note, Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir: The Constitutional
Right to Prove Filiation and the $670,000 Blood Test, 38 LoY. L. REV. 493
(1992); C.B. Pochd, Recent Development, Chatelain v. State: Defending the
Wrongful Death Action by Asserting the Existence of an Illegitimate Child of the
Decedent, 66 TUL. L. REV. 2057 (1992); Barbara L. Keller, Comment, Surrogate
Motherhood Contracts in Louisiana: To Ban or to Regulate?, 49 LA. L. REV.
143 (1988); Valerie Seal Meiners, Comment, The Child with Two Fathers:
Updating the Wisdom of Solomon, 46 LA. L. REV. 1211 (1986); Kathryn
Venturatos Lorio, Family Law: Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin
Territory for Legislation, 44 LA. L. REV. 1641 (1984); Katherine Shaw Spaht,
Developments in the Law, 1983-1984: Persons, 45 LA. L. REV. 467, 467-68
(1984); Roy Edward Blossman, Note, An Unborn Child's Right to Prove
Filiation: Malek v. Yekani-Ford, 44 LA. L. REV. 1777 (1984); Katherine Shaw
Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982: Persons, 43 LA. L. REV. 535
(1982); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981: Persons,
42 LA. L. REV. 403 (1982); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Developments in the Law,
1979-1980: Persons, 41 LA. L. REV. 372 (1981); Helen Scott Johnson, Note,
Louisiana's Presumption of Paternity: The Bastardized Issue, 40 LA. L. REV.
1024 (1980); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1978-1979 Term, Private Law: Persons, 40 LA. L. REV. 543 (1980);
Katherine Shaw Spaht & William Marshall Shaw, Jr., The Strongest
Presumption Challenged: Speculations on Warren v. Richard and Succession of
Mitchell, 37 LA. L. REV. 59 (1976); Neil S. Hyman, Louisiana's New Disavowal
Legislation: A Critical Appraisal, 22 Loy. L. REV. 963 (1976); Durinda L.
Robinson, Note, Presumption of Paternity: An Imposition on the Husband of the
Mother, 3 S.U. L. REV. 102 (1976); Malcolm S. Murchison, The Work of the
Louisiana Legislature for the 1976 Regular Session, Private Law: Persons, 37
LA. L. REV. 95, 98-103 (1976); Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Work of the
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Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term, Private Law: Persons, 35
LA. L. REV. 259, 261-63 (1975); W. Thomas Tete, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969 Term, Private Law: Persons, 30 LA. L.
REv. 171 (1970); Glenn G. Goodier, Note, Presumption of Paternity Under
Louisiana Civil Code Article 184, 16 LoY. L. REV. 235 (1969); P. Terrance J.
Leach, Comment, The Status of Illegitimates in Louisiana, 16 LoY. L. REv. 87
(1969); Lee Hargrave, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1967-1968 Term, Private Law: Persons, 29 LA. L. REV. 171, 171-72 (1969);
Robert A. Pascal, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-
1966 Term, Private Law: Persons, 26 LA. L. REV. 459, 461-63 (1966); Robert
A. Pascal, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term,
Private Law: Persons, 25 LA. L. Rev. 291 (1965); Karl W. Cavanaugh,
Comment, Action en Desaveu- Challenging the Presumption of the Husband's
Paternity, 23 LA. L. REV. 759 (1963); Robert A. Pascal, Persons, 20 LA. L. REV.
211 (1960); Charles Lindsey, Note, Family Law: Determination of Paternity of
Child of Putative Marriage, 19 LA. L. REV. 706 (1959); Robert A. Pascal, Who
is the Papa?, 18 LA. L. REV. 685 (1958); Robert A. Pascal, Persons, 18 LA. L.
REV. 18, 25 (1957); William H. Cook, Jr., Note, Family Law: Use of Blood
Tests in Actions en Desaveu, 17 LA. L. REV. 494 (1957); Robert A. Pascal,
Persons, 17 LA. L. REv. 303, 310 (1957); Robert J. Jones, Note, Family Law-
Illegitimate Children-Proof of Paternity, 15 LA. L. REV. 218 (1954); Harold J.
Brouillette, Comment, Presumption of Legitimacy and the "Action en Desaveu,"
13 LA. L. REV. 587 (1953); Robert A. Pascal, The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term: Persons, 14 LA. L. REV. 114, 121-29
(1953); Robert A. Pascal, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1945-1946 Term: Persons, 7 LA. L. REV. 217, 224-25 (1947); Leonard
Oppenheim, Acknowledgment and Legitimation in Louisiana-Louisiana Act 50
of 1944, 19 TUL. L. REV. 325 (1945); Betty Ann Gremillion, Comment, What
Effect Has Proof of Maternity, 6 LA. L. REV. 268 (1945); Ashton Phelps, Note,
Bastards and Natural Children-Legitimation by Subsequent Marriage-Article
198, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, 11 TUL. L. REV. 309 (1937); Helen S.
Kohlman, Note, Successions: Acknowledgement of Miscegenous Illegitimates,
13 Loy. L. REV. 189 (1966); Robert Moureaux, The French Case-Law As to
Disavowal of Paternity, 6 TuL. L. REV. 445 (1932); L. Julian Samuel, Comment,
Acknowledgment of Illegitimate Children, 6 TuL. L. REV. 120 (1931). In France,
from whose law of filiation much of Louisiana's was derived, the topic is treated
at length in the civil law treatises. See, e.g., Alain Bdnabent, DROIT CIVIL: LA
FAMILLE Nos. 551-795, at 313-441 (10th ed. 2001); Gerard Cornu, DROIT
CIVIL: LA FAMILLE Nos. 195-306, at 313-469 (7th ed. 2001); Patrick Courbe,
DROIT DE LA FAMILLE Nos. 632-1009, at 253-392 (2d ed. 2001); Jean
Carbonnier, DROIT CIVIL: LA FAMILLE: L'ENFANT, LE COUPLE 179-336 (20th
ed. 1999); Henri Mazeaud & Ldon Mazeaud, 1-3 LEONS DE DROIT CIVIL: LA
FAMILLE Nos. 820-984, at 193-401 (Laurent Leveneur rev., 7th ed. 1995);
Charles Aubry & Charles Rau, 9 DRorr CIVIL FRANCAIS §§ 542-46, 554-72, at
165-303 (Paul Esmein rev., 6th ed. 1953); Marcel Planiol & Georges Ripert, 2
TRArrtE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS: LA FAMILLE Nos. 709-1073, at
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585-929 (Andrd Rouast rev., 2d ed. 1952); Gabriel Baudry-Lacantinerie & G.
Chdneux, 3 TRAiTr THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL: DES PERSONNES
Nos. 399-746, at 271-726 (2d ed. 1902); Victor Marcadd, 2 EXPLICATION
THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL Nos.- 1-122, 1-126 (8th ed. 1886);
Frangois Laurent, 3 PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS Nos. 359-493, at 422-
630 (2d ed. 1876); Frangois Laurent, 4 PRINCIPES DE DROrr CIVIL FRANCAIS
Nos. 1-254, 5-340 (2d ed. 1876); C.-B.-M. Toullier, 1 DROIT CIVIL FRANIAIS
Nos. 784-1038, at 183-232 (nouv. ed. 1837). French legal periodical articles
also treat the law of filiation in great detail. See, e.g., Anne Lefebvre Teillard,
"Pater Is Est Quem Nuptiae Demonstrant": Jalons pour une Histoire de la
Presomption de Paternit6, 69 REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRAN(AIS ET
ETRANGER 331 (1991); Louis Amiable, De la Paternitg du Mari en Droit
Romain et dans l'Ancienne Jurisprudence Franqaise, 8 REVUE HISTORIQUE DE
DROIT FRAN4AIS ET EtTRANGER 5 (1862).
2. The sole exception to this generalization is the revision of the part of the
Civil Code that pertains to "marital donations," namely, Titles IX and X of Book
III. On that revision, see generally J.-R. Trahan, Glossae on the New Law of
Marital Donations, 65 LA. L. REV. 1059 (2005).
3. Though I have served on the Committee for several years now (since
2001), I had only a small hand in the preparation of the Projet. That was so
because, by the time I was appointed to the Committee, the Projet was already
nearly complete.
4. As a general rule, Civil Code revisions that originate in the Institute
have a two-fold purpose: (1) to bring the prior law "up to date"; and (2) to
correct technical deficiencies in the prior law. See Trahan, supra note 2, at
1060-61. This Revision is no exception. For more on the purposes behind the
Revision, see Katherine Shaw Spaht, Who's Your Momma, Who are Your
Daddies? Louisiana's New Law of Filiation, 67 LA. L. REV. 307 (2007).
5. See Trahan, supra note 2.
Tit. VII. Parent and Child Tit. VII. Parent and Child
6
6. Glossa on Tit. VII. Parent and Child. After the Revision, Title VII of
Book I remains, as it was before, subdivided into several chapters. But the
Revision has altered the schema of subdivision in part, as the following chart
reveals:
Tit. VII. Parent and Child Tit. VII. Parent and Child
Ch. 1. Of Children in General Ch. 1. Proof of Maternity
Ch. 2. Of Legitimate Children Ch. 2. Proof of Paternity
Sec. 1. Of Legitimacy Sec. 1. The Presumption of
Resulting from Marriage Paternity of the Husband;
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Sec. 2. Of the Manner of
Proving Legitimate
Filiation
Ch. 3. Of Illegitimate Children
Sec. 1. Of Legitimation
Sec. 2. Of the Acknowledgment
of Illegitimate Children
Ch. 4. Of Adoption
Ch. 5. Of Parental Authority
Disavowal of Paternity;
Contestation;
Establishment of Paternity
Subsec. A. The Presumption
Subsec. B. Disavowal
Subsec. C. Contestation and
Establishment of
Paternity
Sec. 2. Presumption of Paternity
by Subsequent Marriage
and Acknowledgment
Sec. 3. Other Methods of
Establishing Paternity
Ch. 3. [Blank]
Ch. 4. Of Adoption
Ch. 5. Of Parental Authority
It will be noted that the changes to Title VII made by the Revision pertain
only to what had been the first three chapters: these have been replaced by two
new chapters that, at least in terms of their structure, are significantly different.
The remaining two chapters of Title VII, Chapters 4 and 5, by contrast, have not
been changed in the least. With the exception noted in the next glossa, the
subject matter of the two new chapters is the same as that of the three old
chapters that they replace, namely, the law of "filiation by nature." The subject
matters of the fourth and fifth chapters, by contrast, are "adoptive filiation" and
"parental authority," respectively. On the distinction between filiation by nature
and adoptive filiation, see supra note 1, first paragraph.
Chapter 1. Of Children in
General
7
No corresponding chapter heading I
No corresponding articleArt. 179. Legitimate children
Legitimate children are those
who are either born or conceived
during marriage or who have been
legitimated as provided hereafter.
I |
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Art. 180. Illegitimate children No corresponding article
Illegitimate children are those
who are conceived and born out
of marriage.
Art. 181. Legitimation No corresponding article
Illegitimate children may be
legitimated in certain cases, in the
manner prescribed by law.
7. Glossa on old Chapter 1 "in toto." Chapter 1 of the old legislation,
entitled "Of Children in General," has been completely suppressed. That
chapter established a fundamental distinction, within the law of filiation,
between legitimate and illegitimate children, a distinction that, at least at one
time, had significant implications in the law of parent-child relations and the law
of intestate succession. That time, however, has long since passed. See
generally Succession of Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980) (declaring
unconstitutional former Civil Code article 919 (1980), which excluded
illegitimates from participating in the succession of their father when he was
survived by legitimate descendants, ascendants, collateral relatives, or a
surviving spouse).
This is not to say that the law, including the law of filiation, draws no
distinctions whatsoever between children who, under former Chapter 1, would
have qualified as legitimate and children who, under former Chapter 1, would
have qualified as illegitimate. Such distinctions continue to exist (e.g., several
of the presumptions of paternity arise only under circumstances in which the
child's mother is or was married at the time of the child's conception or birth or
marries the child's father after the child's birth, in other words, where the child,
under former Chapter 1, would have been considered "legitimate"). What is
different now is that the rules that establish these distinctions are no longer cast
in terms of "legitimate" and "illegitimate" or any others that might call to mind
the stigma that was and, to some degree, still is associated with the latter.
Arts. 182, 183.8 No corresponding articles
Repealed by 1979 La. Acts
No. 607
8. Glossa on OAs 182, 183 "in toto." These articles, which were repealed
years ago, had defined, respectively, "adulterous bastards" and "incestuous
bastards."
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No corresponding chapter Ch. 1. Proof of Matemity9
9. Glossa on new Chapter 1 "in toto." The heading of this chapter, like its
content, is new. See infra note 10.
No corresponding article Art. 184. Maternity'l
Maternity may be established
by a preponderance of the
evidence that the child was born
of a particular woman, lI except as
otherwise provided by law.'
2
10. Glossae on NA 184 "in toto."
a. As it stood at the moment when 2005 Act 192, § 1 took effect, Title VII
of Book I of the Civil Code did not directly provide for proof of maternity. That
had not, however, always been the case. Until 1980, Title VII had made some
such provision, though one whose scope had been limited to proof of maternity
by illegitimate children. The provision had been made in article 212, which had
read as follows:
Illegitimate children of every description may make proof of their
maternal descent, provided the mother be not a married woman.
But the child who will make such proof shall be bound to show that
he is identically the same person as the child whom the mother brought
forth.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 212 (1870), repealed by 1980 La. Acts No. 549, § 2
(emphasis added).
Though NA 184 is, then, "new" in the sense that it speaks to an issue that
the previous legislation did not, in another sense NA 184 is not new at all.
There were no reported cases under the old legislation in which the question of
"who's my momma?" was ever addressed. But one must suppose that had the
issue ever been presented to them, the courts, applying general principles of
proof, would have concluded (1) that the burden of proof rested on the person
claiming that this woman was the mother of that child, and (2) that the
claimant's standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence. These rules,
of course, are precisely those that NA 184 embodies. It is for this reason that
comment (a) to NA 184 indicates that the article merely "clarifies" (as opposed
to "changes") the law.
b. That the old legislation made no provision for proof of maternity is not
difficult to explain. The term "maternity" was until recent times unequivocal.
The mother was, and could only have been, considered to be the woman who
gave birth to the child, see infra note 11; therefore, the answer to the question
"who's my momma?" was, in practice, only rarely in doubt. As the Roman
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jurisconsults put it, mater semper certa est, etiam si vulgo conceperit ("the
mother is always certain, even if she has conceived the child promiscuously").
See DIG. 2.4.5 (Paulus, Ad Edictum 4); see generally Carbonnier, supra note 1,
at 280-81; Baudry-Lacantinerie, supra note 1, No. 430, at 315 & n. 1; Laurent,
supra note 1, No. 360, at 423-24; Toullier, supra note 1, No. 786, at 184. Now
that the term maternity has become equivocal, see infra note 11, that question
will undoubtedly arise with greater frequency in the future than it did in the past.
c. Provisions for maternal filiation are quite common in modem civil
codes. See, e.g., Argentine C6DIGO CIVIL art. 242 ("Maternity will be
established, even without acknowledgment, by proof of the birth and the identity
of the child."); German BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 1591 ("The mother of
the child is the woman who gives birth to it."); Luxembourgeois CODE CIVIL art.
341 1, 2 ("Maternity outside of marriage can be judicially declared. The
child who exercises the action must prove, by any means whatsoever, that he
was born from the supposed mother."); Mexican Federal C6DIGO CIVIL art. 360
("Filiation of children born outside of marriage results, in relation to the mother,
from the sole act of birth."); Portuguese C6DIGO CIVIL art. 1796(1) ("With
respect to the mother, filiation results from the fact of birth and is established in
the terms of [other articles]."); Swiss CODE CIVIL art. 252(1) ("In regard to the
mother, filiation results from the birth."); Venezuelan C6DIGO CIVIL art. 197
("Maternal filiation results from the birth and is proved by means of an act of
declaration of birth inscribed in the books of the civil registry, with the
identification of the mother.").
11. Glossae on child born of a particular woman ....
a. In earlier times, everyone knew what "maternity" meant. That was so
(1) because, given the state of reproductive technology, it was impossible for
two distinct women, on the one hand, to supply the egg from which the child
would be created and, on the other, to carry and give birth to the child and (2)
because, given the state of social mores regarding reproductive relationships, it
was considered immoral for one woman to produce a child that, from the very
beginning, she did not intend to rear herself but, rather, intended to turn over to
some other woman to be reared by her. Thus, the "mother" of the child was she
who, at once, wanted the child for herself, supplied the egg from which the child
had been created, and carried and gave birth to the child.
Today things are no longer so simple. The cause of the complexity is two-
fold. First, there is the development of modem assisted reproductive technology
("ART"), which has made it possible to dissociate the act of supplying the egg
from which a child is made from the acts of carrying and giving birth to the
child. It can, and does, now happen that an egg will be extracted from one
woman-the "egger"-and, once it has been fertilized ex utero, that the
resulting embryo will be implanted into the uterus of another woman-the
"incubator-birther"-who will then carry and deliver the child. Which of these
women, the egger or the incubator-birther, is the child's "mother"? Second,
there is the development of new forms of reproductive relationships that have
made it permissible for a woman to agree to create a child that will not be "hers"
but will, instead, be "another woman's." It can, and does, now happen that a
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married or cohabiting couple, having discovered that the woman is infertile, will
enter into a so-called "surrogate mother" contract with another woman whereby
the latter will agree to become impregnated with the man's sperm, to carry and
to give birth to the resulting child, and finally to turn the child over to them so
that they may rear it as their own. Which of these women, the egger-incubator-
birther (the surrogate) or the woman who willed to bring the child into existence,
intending to nurture it as her own, and for whom the child was destined (what
might be called the mother by "will" or "intent" or "destination") is the child's
"mother"?
The use of the phrase "was born of," as comment (a) to NA 184 indicates, is
intended to resolve these uncertainties. According to that comment, the new
article "clarifqies]" the law by "establishing that the mother of a child is the
woman who gives birth to the child." Thus, the notion of "motherhood by will"
is rejected in favor of biological motherhood and, among possible candidates for
the status of "biological" mother, the incubator-birther is chosen in preference to
the egger. This understanding of maternity is consistent with that reflected in
OA 212 (repealed 1980), see supra note 10(a), which had referred to the mother
as the woman from whose body the child had been "brought forth." It is also
consistent with the understanding of maternity reflected in the codes of other
civil law jurisdictions. See, e.g., German BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 1591
("The mother of the child is the woman who gives birth to it."); Portuguese
C6DIGO CIVIL art. 1796(1) ("With respect to the mother, filiation results from
the fact of birth and is established in the terms of [other articles]."); Quebec
CIVIL CODE art. 523 1 ("Paternal filiation and maternalfiliation are proved by
the act of birth, regardless of the circumstances of the child's birth.") (emphasis
added); Swiss CODE CIVIL art. 252(1) ("In regard to the mother, filiation results
from the birth."); Venezuelan C6DIGO CIVIL art. 197 ("Maternal filiation results
from the birth and is proved by means of an act of declaration of birth inscribed
in the books of the civil registry, with the identification of the mother.").
b. As comment (b) to NA 184 correctly indicates, proof of maternity (i.e,
that this child was "born of" that woman) may be made by means of any and
every kind of evidence. It is, of course, the general rule that any and all
evidence, provided it be relevant and otherwise admissible, may be introduced
to prove or disprove any fact in issue. See generally LA. CODE EVID. ANN. arts.
402, 403 (2006). And nothing in NA 184 indicates that, with respect to the
subject matter of this article, the legislature intended to depart from the general
rule. Ubi lex no distinguit, ne nos distinguere debemus.
12. Glossae on except as otherwise provided by law. The rule that the
incubator-birther is the mother of the child is a general, not an absolute, rule;
that is to say, the rule admits of exceptions. There are at least two.
a. One such case is that of "surrogate motherhood." Understanding
Louisiana's legislation regarding "surrogacy contracts" requires a prior
acquaintance with the peculiar terminology and taxonomy of such agreements.
These agreements can be classified on the basis of at least two different lines of
comparison. First, they can be classified according to their cause. If the
surrogate receives payment or some other quidpro quo for her services, then her
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surrogacy is called "onerous" or, more commonly, "compensated"; if she does
not, it is called "gratuitous." Second, they can be classified according to the
varying roles of the surrogate. One possibility is that the surrogate might agree
not only that she will carry and give birth to the child, but also that she will
supply the egg whence the child will be created. In such a case, the child must
be created by the artificial insemination of the surrogate. Because this was the
first kind of surrogacy arrangement to be developed, it is called "traditional."
The other possibility is that the surrogate might agree merely to carry and to
give birth to the child. In such a case, the child must be produced by in vitro
fertilization, followed by surgical implantation of the resulting embryo in the
surrogate's uterus. Because the surrogate's role is limited to that of incubator-
birther, this kind of surrogacy is called "gestational." See generally Amy
Garrity, Comment, A Comparative Analysis of Surrogacy Law in the United
States and Great Britain: A Proposed Model Statute for Louisiana, 60 LA. L.
REv. 809, 809 (2000) (discussing differences between "traditional" and
"gestational" surrogacy). Gestational surrogacy agreements, in turn, can be
subdivided according to the nature of the relationship between the egger, on the
one hand, and the incubator-birther, on the other. One possibility is that the two
women might be relatives; the other, that they might not.
Now, let us proceed to the legislation. One piece of it is Louisiana Revised
Statutes Section 9:2713, which provides as follows:
A. A contract for surrogate motherhood as defined herein shall be
absolutely null and shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to
public policy.
B. "Contract for surrogate motherhood" means any agreement
whereby a person not married to the contributor of the sperm agrees for
valuable consideration to be inseminated, to carry any resulting fetus to
birth, and then to relinquish to the contributor of the sperm the custody
and all rights and obligations to the child.
The others are Louisiana Revised Statutes Sections 40:32, 34, which provide the
following:
§ 32. Definition of terms
As used in this Chapter, the following terms shall have the meanings
ascribed to them in this Section unless otherwise provided for or unless
the context otherwise indicates:
(1) "Biological parents" means a husband and wife, joined by legal
marriage recognized as valid in this state, who provide sperm and egg
for in vitro fertilization, performed by a licensed physician, when the
resulting fetus is carried and delivered by a surrogate birth parent who
is related by blood or affinity to either the husband or wife.
§ 34. Vital records forms
B. The forms shall be printed and supplied or provided by electronic
means by the state registrar and the required contents are:
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(1) Contents of birth certificate. The certificate of birth shall contain,
as a minimum, the following items:
(a) Full name of child.
(i)
(viii) In the case of a child born of a surrogate birth parent who is
related by blood or affinity to a biological parent, the surname of the
child's biological parents shall be the surname of the child.
(h)(i)
(v) In the case of a child born of a surrogate birth parent who is related
by blood or affinity to a biological parent, the full name of the
biological parent who is proven to be the father by DNA testing shall
be listed as the father.
(i) Maiden name of mother; however, if the child was born of a
surrogate birth parent who is related by blood or affinity to a biological
parent, the maiden name of the biological parent who is proven to be
the mother by DNA testing shall be listed as the mother and the name
of the surrogate birth parent is not required.
(j) In the case of a child born of a surrogate birth parent who is related
by blood or affinity to a biological parent, the biological parents proven
to be the mother and father by DNA testing shall be considered the
parents of the child.
To call this legislation "patchy" is to indulge in understatement. The first
siatute deals only with one kind of surrogacy contract-an "onerous" contract
for "traditional" surrogacy. It is this one kind of contract, and this one alone,
that falls under the prohibition of that statute. The second statute deals only
with one kind of surrogacy contract, a different kind-a "gratuitous" contract for
"gestational" surrogacy "between relatives."
Obviously enough, this legislation leaves many important questions
unanswered. In doubt is the enforceability of the following kinds of surrogacy
agreements: (1) a "gratuitous" contract for "traditional" surrogacy; (2) any
contract, be it "gratuitous" or "onerous," for "gestational" surrogacy "between
strangers"; and (3) an "onerous" contract for "gestational" surrogacy "between
relatives."
Be that as it may, this much is clear: where a child is produced pursuant to a
gratuitous contract for gestational surrogacy between relatives (the only kind of
surrogacy contract that the legislation clearly authorizes), the mother of that
child is its egger rather than its incubator-birther, the general rule of NA 184 to
the contrary notwithstanding.
b. Another such case is that of "human embryos." Consider this provision
of Louisiana's so-called "Human Embryos" statute:
If the in vitro fertilization patients renounce, by notarial act, their
parental rights for in utero implantation, then the in vitro fertilized
human ovum shall be available for adoptive implantation in accordance
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with written procedures of the facility where it is housed or stored. The
in vitro fertilization patients may renounce their parental rights in favor
of another married couple, but only if the other couple is willing and
able to receive the in vitro fertilized ovum. No compensation shall be
paid or received by either couple to renounce parental rights.
Constructive fulfillment of the statutory provisions for adoption in this
state shall occur when a married couple executes a notarial act of
adoption of the in vitro fertilized ovum and birth occurs.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (2000). To say that "in vitro fertilization patients"
may renounce their "parental rights" is, of course, to imply that those patients
are "parents." At least one of these parents must be a woman, for (1) the "in
vitro fertilization patients," according to the Human Embryos statute, can only
be a married couple, and (2) a married couple, according to the Louisiana
Constitution and the Civil Code, can consist only of a man and a woman.
"Woman parent" is, of course, another name for "mother." But this mother is
not and, indeed, cannot be the "incubator-birther" of the child (that would be
impossible, given that the child has not yet been implanted, much less born), but
is and, indeed, can only be the "egger" of the child. Thus, the mother of a
human embryo is its egger, the general rule of NA 184 to the contrary
notwithstanding.
No corresponding chapter Ch. 2. Proof of Paternity
13. Glossa on new Chapter 2 "in toto." Though the heading of this chapter
is new, its content, with only a few exceptions, is not. See infra notes 14-19.
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Art. 184. Presumed paternity
of husband
The husband of the mother is
presumed to be the father of all
children born or conceived during
the marriage.
Art. 185. Presumption of
paternity, date of birth
A child born less than three
hundred days after the dissolution
of the marriage is presumed to
have been conceived during the
marriage. A child born three
hundred days or more after the
dissolution of the marriage is not
presumed to be the child of the
husband.
Art. 185. Presumption of
paternity 14 of husband 15
The husband of the mother is
presumed to be the father of a
child born during the marriage
6
or within three hundred days from
the date of the termination of the
marriage. 7, 18, 19
14. Glossa on [p]resumption of paternity .... Like several of the articles in
old Chapters 2 and 3, several of those in new Chapter 2 establish various
"presumptions" of paternity. It is important to understand the nature of these
presumptions. First, they are "evidentiary presumptions," not "conclusive
presumptions" (which are really substantive legal rules disguised as evidentiary
presumptions), nor "presumptions" of the genre to which "the presumption of
innocence" belongs (which are really rules for allocating the burden of
persuasion). See generally LA. CODE EvID. ANN. arts. 301-08 (2006); Keith B.
Hall, Evidentiary Presumptions, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1321 (1998); Stephen I.
Dwyer, Comment, Presumptions and Burden of Proof 21 LoY. L. REV. 377,
390-94 (1975); Geoffrey J. Orr, Comment, Toward a Workable Civil
Presumptions Rule in Louisiana, 53 LA. L. REv. 1625, 1632-35 (1993).
Second, they are "legal presumptions," not "presumptions of fact" (which are
really just reasonable inferences of fact). See generally LA. Civ. CODE ANN.
arts. 2285, 2288 (1870); Safil Litvinoff, OBLIGATIONS §§ 12-121, 12-122, 12-
125, in 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 384-86, 389-90 (2d ed. 2001);
Dwyer, supra, at 394-401; Orr, supra, at 1627-31.
15. Glossa on [p]resumption of paternity of the husband. NA 185
reproduces OAs 184 and 185 without substantive change, as I will explain in the
following glossae. The presumption established in these articles is both
ubiquitous-nearly every Western legal system recognizes some version of the
presumption-and ancient-it can be traced at least as far back as Rome. The
Roman jurisconsults expressed it in the maxim pater is est quem nuptiae
demonstrant ("the father is he whom marriage points out"). See DIG. 2.4.5
(Paulus, Ad Edictum 4); see also Courbe, supra note 1, No. 716, at 286-87;
Carbonnier, supra note 1, at 223; Bnabent, supra note 1, No. 603, at 344-45;
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Rubellin-Devichi, supra note 1, Nos. 1348-50, at 444-45; Mazeaud, supra note
1, No. 871, at 270; Aubry & Rau, supra note 1, § 545, at 45 & n.1; Baudry-
Lacantinerie, supra note 1, Nos. 432-33, at 317-19; Laurent, supra note 1, No.
361, at 427 & n.1; Planiol, supra note 1, Nos. 769-70, at 643-45; Toullier,
supra note 1, Nos. 787-90, at 184. For the historical development of the
presumption pater is est .... see Teillard, supra note 1; Amiable, supra note 1.
16. Glossa on [t]he husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of a
child born during the marriage . . . The first part of NA 185 reproduces
without change the part of OA 185, which provided that "[t]he husband of the
mother is presumed to be the father of all children born . . . during the
marriage." In this regard, NA 185 does not change the law.
17. Glossa on [tihe husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of a
child born... within three hundred days from the date of the termination of the
marriage. The second part of NA 185 reformulates rules that were formerly set
out in OA 184 ("The husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of all
children ... conceived during the marriage.") and OA 185 ("A child born less
than three hundred days after the dissolution of the marriage is presumed to have
been conceived during the marriage."). Like the other part of NA 185, see supra
note 16, this part of NA 185 does not change the law. That is so even though
this part of NA 185 does not reproduce the last sentence of OA 184: "A child
born three hundred days or more after the dissolution of the marriage is not
presumed to be the child of the husband." The rule set forth in that sentence was
superfluous in that it was redundant of what is perhaps the most basic of all the
general principles of proof, which is that nothing is presumed. The sole reason
for suppressing that sentence was, quite simply, to improve the technical quality
of the legislation. On the list of vices of legislative technique, redundancy
appears near the top.
18. Glossa on marriage. The term "marriage," as used in both the first and
the second clauses of NA 185, refers not only to a marriage that is valid, but also
to one that (1) is relatively null, see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 97 (2006) ("A
relatively null marriage produces civil effects until it is declared null."), or (2)
though absolutely null, is nonetheless "putative," see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
96 3 (2006) ("A[n absolutely null] marriage contracted by a party in good faith
[i.e., a putative marriage] produces civil effects in favor of a child of the
parties."). See Harrington v. Barfield, 30 La. Ann. 1297 (1878) (ruling that the
child of a marriage that was absolutely null on account of bigamy was
nevertheless "legitimate" thanks to the wife-mother's good faith); Lindsey,
supra note 1, at 706 ("The child of an invalid marriage contracted in good faith
by at least one of the spouses is legitimate as to both."); see also Planiol, supra
note 1, No. 325, at 254 ('The children born of a putative marriage remain
legitimate... ."); Gabriel Baudry-Lacantinerie & Maurice Houques-Fourcade, 2
TRArrt THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL: DES PERSONNES No. 1913, at
471 (2d ed. 1900) ("[T]he children born during the marriage or at least
conceived before its annulment, whether they have been [so] born or conceived
before or after the spouses have discovered the error that they have committed,
should be reputed to be legitimate in regard to the two spouses and their
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relatives, even when only one of the spouses is found to have been in good
faith."); Charles Aubry & Charles Rau, 7 DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS § 460, at 74
(Paul Esmein rev., 6th ed. 1948) ("Provided that good faith existed in the two
spouses or one of them only, a putative marriage always produces, in favor of
the children that issue from their intercourse, all the effects of a valid
marriage."). On putative marriage in general, see Monica Hof Wallace, The
Pitfalls of a Putative Marriage and the Call for a Putative Divorce, 64 LA. L.
REv. 71 (2003).
19. Glossa on NA 185: miscellaneous. The presumptions established by
this article (unlike, say, the presumption established by NA 196, see infra note
74) can be "invoked" not only on behalf of the child, but also on behalf of the
father. This conclusion rests on three considerations. First, there is an argument
from general principles. That a presumption may, as a general rule, be invoked
by anyone for any purpose is one of those "general principles" of the law that,
though it is never stated (undoubtedly because it is so obvious), nevertheless
cannot be doubted. Had the legislature intended to deviate from so fundamental
a principle, it undoubtedly would have said so. Second, there is an exegetical
argument. Given that the legislature, in the case of the presumption of paternity
established by NA 196, specifically excepted that presumption from the general
rule (in particular, provided that the presumption could be invoked only on
behalf of one party) but, in the cases of the other presumptions of paternity
established by the Revision, remained silent on this score, it follows a contrario
that the legislature did not want to except those other presumptions from that
general rule. Third, there is a historical argument. As has already been noted,
see supra note 15, the presumptions of NA 185 are mere reproductions of the
presumptions of OAs 184 and 185. No one ever doubted that the presumptions
of OAs 184 and 185 could be invoked by the father no less than by the child.
See, e.g., Cosey v. Allen, 316 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975) (Shortess, J.)
(permitting a presumed father to bring an action to recover damages for the
wrongful death of his presumed children).
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Art. 185. Presumption of
paternity, date of birth
A child born less than three
hundred days after the dissolution
of the marriage is presumed to
have been conceived during the
marriage. A child born three
hundred days or more after the
dissolution of the marriage is not
presumed to be the child of the
husband.
Art. 186. Presumption of
paternity, negation
The husband of the mother is
not presumed to be the father of
the child if another man is
presumed to be the father.
Art. 186. Presumption if child
is born after divorce or after
death of husband; effect of
disavowal
If a child is born within three
hundred days from the day of the
termination of a marriage and his
mother has married again before
his birth, the first husband is
presumed to be the father.2°'2'
If the first husband, or his
successor, obtains a judgment of
disavowal of paternity of the
child,22 the second husband is
presumed to be the father.23 The
second husband, or his successor,
may disavow paternity24 if he
institutes a disavowal action
within a peremptive period of one
year from the day that the
judgment of disavowal obtained
by the first husband is final and
definitive.25
20. Glossae on NA 187 paragraph 1 "in toto."
a. The first paragraph of NA 186 reformulates the substance of OA 186,
though in quite different terms. Thanks to the cryptic formulation of OA 186, its
meaning was not immediately clear. That does not mean, however, that its
meaning was in doubt. To the contrary, with just a little bit of interpretive
coaxing, one could fairly easily get that meaning to show itself. The proper
interpretation of the old article is reflected in the following doctrine and
jurisprudence:
Although not clearly revealed, the article apparently is intended to
apply where the wife, married to her second husband, gives birth to a
child less than three hundred days after the dissolution of her previous
marriage. In that instance the husband of the first marriage is presumed
father of the child.
Murchison, supra note 1, at 100-01.
[S]tanding alone, La.Civ.Code. art. 186, which provides an exception to
Article 184 when "another man is presumed to be the father," is
ambiguous concerning whether "another man" refers to the first
husband ... or the current husband... [A]n analysis of the statutory
scheme, in pari materia, clarifies these ambiguities, yielding the
conclusion that a child conceived during one marriage and born into
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another is a "child of the marriage" between the two people who were
married at the time of conception, rather than at birth.
Dupre v. Dupre, 834 So. 2d 1272, 1281-82 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2002) (Woodard,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). This same meaning, formerly
hidden beneath the obscure wording of OA 186, is now made manifest in the
much more straightforward wording of NA 186 paragraph 1.
b. In this paragraph we find one of the few changes that the legislature
made to the Projet. In the Projet, that paragraph had read as follows:
If a child is born within three hundred days from the day of the
termination of a marriage and his mother has married again before his
birth:
(1) The second husband is presumed to be the father if the previous
marriage was terminated by judgment of divorce, declaration of nullity,
or declaration of death under Article 54.
(2) The first husband is presumed to be the father if the previous
marriage was terminated by death.
Under that paragraph, the presumption of paternity would not have operated in
favor of the mother's first husband in all cases, as it does under the paragraph as
it was finally enacted; rather, depending on the circumstances, in particular, the
cause of the dissolution of the mother's first marriage, the presumption would
sometimes have operated in favor of the mother's first husband (where the first
marriage had been dissolved by death) and sometimes in favor of the mother's
second husband (where the first marriage had been dissolved by divorce, etc.).
The amendment to the Projet came at the request of Senator Derrick
Shepherd. The basis for his amendment was, quite simply, "moralistic." As he
correctly concluded, the proposed presumption in favor of the second husband
presupposed that the mother had had sexual relations with that man-he who
would later become her "second husband"--at a time at which she had still been
married to another man-her "first husband." In other words, the mother had
committed adultery. This presupposition the senator found morally repulsive.
Though I concur in the senator's assessment of this presupposition and,
further, approve of the amendment that he offered up to correct the perceived
problem (in fact, I "ghost wrote" the amendment for him and prepared talking
points for him to assist him in explaining his concerns to Senate Judiciary
Committee A), I must admit that his and my "moralism" on this point comes at a
price. In the situation to which the proposed presumption in favor of the second
husband would have applied, the child in question will be born into a family that
consists of the mother and this second husband. To provide, as does the
amendment, that another man-the first husband-is presumed to be the child's
father will, of necessity, complicate things for this otherwise intact family. As
long as the presumption in favor of the first husband stands, this family will
remain vulnerable to interference from him, specifically, to his assertion of his
right, as presumed father, to custody of or at least visitation with the child. For
this threat of interference to be eliminated, some sort of litigation will be
necessary: either a disavowal action by the first husband or a contestation action
by the mother against the first husband. See NAs 191-94. See also Murchison,
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supra note 1, at 101-02 & n.47. In either case, the mother and her new husband
will be forced to suffer the inconveniences that are inherent in any litigation-
the lost time and the financial cost-as well as one other inconvenience that is
unique to this specific litigation, namely, that to get the relief they seek, they
will, in effect, have to confess their adultery in their pleadings and perhaps even
in open court. Even so, any "disutility" that may result from these
inconveniences is, in my judgment, a small price to pay for avoiding the
unseemliness inherent in presuming adultery. And the adulteress and her
accomplice will hardly be in a position to complain: given the magnitude of the
evil they have committed, these inconveniences are a lenient penalty indeed,
especially when compared to those of times gone by. On the harms caused by
adultery, see William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposal to Prevent
Adultery and Save Families: Two Old Torts Looking for a New Career, 33 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 985 (2001); on the punishments formerly meted out to those who caused
these harms, see Daniel E. Murray, Ancient Laws on Adultery---A Synopsis, I J.
FAM. L. 89 (1961).
21. Glossa on NA 187 paragraph 1: miscellaneous. The presumption
established by this article (unlike, say, the presumption established by NA 196,
see infra note 74) can be "invoked" not only on behalf of the child, but also on
behalf of the father. For the rationale underlying this conclusion, see supra note
18.
22. Glossa on [i]f the first husband, or his successor, obtains a judgment of
disavowal of paternity of the child .... This first part of the first sentence of the
second paragraph of NA 186, clearly enough, presupposes that the first husband
of the mother, or his successor, may bring an action to disavow paternity in such
a situation, that is, where, before the child was born, the mother took a second
husband. This presupposition is correct. See NA 187, sentence 1.
23. Glossa on the second husband is presumed to be the father. The
provision in the first sentence of the second paragraph of NA 186 that a
successful disavowal action by the first husband or his successor triggers a
presumption of paternity vis-6-vis the mother's second husband is new. Though
the old law permitted the first husband or his successor to bring such an action
and, further, specified the effect that a successful judgment in such an action
would have on the relationship between the mother'sfirst husband and the child,
that law was silent regarding the effect, if any, that such a judgment would have
on the relationship between the mother's new husband and the child. The proper
interpretation to be given this legislative silence, in my view, is that the
legislature intended for there to be no such effect. If I am right about that, then
the part of NA 186 under examination changes the law on this point and changes
it rather profoundly.
The rationale underlying this change in the law is not difficult to divine. In
such cases, if the mother's first husband is not, in fact, the child's father, then
chances are the mother's new husband is. That is to say, if the presumption that
the mother's first husband is the father has been rebutted, then presuming that
the mother's new husband is the child's father will more often than not capture
the "biological truth."
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24. Glossa on [t]he second husband, or his successor, may disavow
paternity .... Given the scope of NA 187, which is undoubtedly broad enough
to apply to a second husband who is presumed to be the child's father, it was,
perhaps, unnecessary to include this statement in NA 186. The revisers,
however, judged that a little bit of redundancy was a small price to pay for the
benefit of leaving no possible room for doubt.
25. Glossae on institutes a disavowal action within a peremptive period of
one year from the day that the judgment of disavowal obtained by the first
husband is final and definitive.
a. One can, and I would, argue that the rule set forth in this part of NA 186
is "in the wrong place" within the schema of the new legislation. Because it
concerns a "[t]ime limit for disavowal by the husband" (rubric of NA 189), the
proper place for it would be in NA 189 or, perhaps, in a separate article
immediately after NA 189. In a civilian codification, rules on the same subject
matter ought to be collected in the same place.
b. This part of NA 186 carves out an exception to NA 189, which
establishes the general rule regarding the "[t]ime limit for disavowal by the
husband" (rubric of NA 189). The rule of NA 186 paragraph 2 differs from the
general rule of NA 189 in two respects. First, there is a difference in the nature
of the period: whereas the time limit of NA 189 is prescriptive, that of NA 186
paragraph 2 is peremptive. Second, there is a difference in the "trigger" that
starts the period running: whereas the period of NA 189 ordinarily starts to run
from the date on which the presumed father knows or ought to know of the
child's birth, that of NA 186 paragraph 2 starts to run from the date on which the
judgment of disavowal obtained by the mother's first husband becomes final and
definitive. In all other respects, the two rules are alike, including the length of
the period: one year.
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Art. 187. Action in disavowal,
burden of proof
The husband can disavow
paternity of a child if he proves by
a preponderance of the evidence
facts which reasonably indicate
that he is not the father. However,
these facts must be susceptible of
independent verification or of
corroboration by physical data or
evidence, such as scientific tests
and verifiable physical circumstance
of remoteness, including but not
limited to any one of the following:
(1) Negative blood tests.
(2) Unmatched DNA prints.
(3) Sterility.
(4) Physical impossibility
because of location during the
time of conception.
(5) Any other scientific or
medical evidence which the court
may deem relevant under the
circumstances.
Art. 187. Disavowal action;
proof 6
The husband may disavow
paternity of the child by clear and
convincing evidence that he is not
the father. The testimony of the
husband shall be corroborated by
other evidence.27
26. Glossae on NA 187 "in toto."
a. Like OA 187, NA 187 permits the presumed father to bring a judicial
action to overturn the presumption. To this extent, the substance of OA 187 has
not been changed.
b. Though the new article does not change the answer to the question
"whether" the presumed father may disavow, it does change, at least partly and
subtly, the answer to the question "how" he may disavow. To understand this
element of the new article-what might be called the "proof' element---one
must, of course, be able to distinguish that which has been changed from that
which has not.
i. What has not been changed is the "end" toward which the "proof'
element of the legislation is directed. The common objective of the proof
element in both the old and the new articles is this: to require that the
presumption of paternity be rebutted by means of evidence that is in some sense
more substantial than that which is sufficient to establish a contested fact in
ordinary private-law litigation.
ii. What has been changed are the "means" employed to achieve that end.
The means employed by OA 187 consisted simply of a restriction on the kinds of
evidence that could be used to rebut the presumption, specifically, a restriction
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that identified several different highly reliable kinds of evidence that might well
suffice. So it was that that article required the disavower to produce evidence
that was "susceptible of independent verification or corroboration by physical
data or evidence, such as scientific tests and verifiable physical circumstance of
remoteness .... ." By contrast, the means employed by NA 187 involve, at once,
a restriction on the kinds of evidence that can be used to rebut the presumption
and an elevation of the standard of proof whereby the presumption can be
rebutted. Let us start with the restriction. Unlike the restriction of OA 187,
which identified various kinds of highly reliable evidence that might suffice, the
restriction of NA 187 identifies one highly suspect kind of evidence that,
standing alone, will not suffice: the uncorroborated testimony of the presumed
father. See infra note 27. Next, let us consider the elevated standard of proof.
Under the new article, proof by a "preponderance of the evidence" is no longer
enough; now the disavower must prove his case by "clear and convincing
evidence."
27. Glossae on [t]he testimony of the husband shall be corroborated by
other evidence.
a. Standing alone, the testimony of the husband is, as a matter of law,
deemed to be insufficiently weighty to rebut the presumption that he is the
child's father.
b. The "other evidence" that must be used to supplement the husband's
testimony could include not only those kinds of evidence that, to use the
language of OA 187, are "susceptible of independent verification," but also
various kinds of evidence that are not, including documentary evidence (for
example, a letter written by the mother in which she asserts that the child is "not
his") and even testimonial evidence (for example, testimony by the mother's
paramour that he had sexual relations with the mother around the probable time
of conception).
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Art. 188. Husband's loss of
right to disavowal
A man who marries a
pregnant woman and who knows
that she is pregnant at the time of
the marriage cannot disavow the
paternity of such child born of
such pregnancy. However, if the
woman has acted in bad faith and
has made a false claim of
fatherhood to the marrying
spouse, he may disavow paternity
provided that he proves such bad
faith on the part of the mother,
and he proves by a preponderance
of the evidence that the child is
not his. If another man is
presumed to be the father,
however, then the provisions of
Article 186 apply.28 The husband
also cannot disavow paternity of a
child born as the result of
artificial insemination of the
mother to which he consented.
Art. 188. Disavowal precluded
in case of assisted conception
The husband of the mother
may not disavow a child born to
his wife as a result of an assisted
conception to which he
consented.29
28. Glossa on OA 188 sentences 1-3 "in toto." The first three sentences of
OA 188 provided that (1) a man who marries a woman whom he knows is
pregnant could not disavow her child (the general rule) unless, (2) the woman
had induced him to marry her by deceiving him into believing that he was the
child's father (the exception). The revisers, perhaps because they feared that the
case contemplated by the exception was not, in fact, exceptional, decided to
suppress the general rule and, with it, the exception. See NA 188. Thanks to
this change in the law, a man who marries a woman whom he knows is pregnant
may now freely disavow her child, regardless of whether he had been duped into
believing that he was the child's father.
29. Glossa on NA 188 "in toto." NA 188 reproduces the substance of the
rule that was set out in the last sentence of OA 188, but, in so doing, expands
that rule's scope. Unlike the last sentence of OA 188, the rule of which applied
to only one form of assisted conception-artificial insemination-the rule of NA
188 applies, in principle, to any and every form of assisted conception,
including, in addition to artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization followed by
surgical implantation.
But there is at least one form of assisted conception as to which the
application of the rule of NA 188 is problematic, namely, surrogate motherhood.
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The problem arises from uncertainty regarding the meaning of the phrase "child
born to his wife." One possibility is that "born to". is equivalent to "born of," as
that expression is used in NA 184. If that is so, then the rule in question strips
the husband of his disavowal right where his wife, with his permission, serves as
a surrogate (for then the child would be "born of' the wife), but not where his
wife, with his permission, engages another woman to serve as their surrogate
(for then the child would not be "born of' the wife). Where the surrogacy
agreement involved is lawful (that is, the surrogacy is gratuitous, gestational,
and intrafamilial), such results are absurd: in the former case, though the other
woman, not the wife, would be regarded as the mother per Louisiana Revised
Statutes Sections 40:32, 34, see supra note 12(a), the husband, per NA 188,
would have no disavowal right; in the latter case, though the wife, not the other
woman, would be regarded as the mother per Louisiana Revised Statutes
Sections 40:32, 34, see supra note 12(a), the husband would have a disavowal
right. Such a result is absurd for it frustrates what was undoubtedly the purpose
behind NA 188, namely, to assure that whenever the wife ends up being
considered the mother as a result of acts to which her husband consents, he must
be considered (or, at the very least, must be presumed to be) the father. And so,
another possible interpretation must be sought. Would it not be permissible to
read the phrase "child born to his wife" as if it meant "child born under
circumstances such that his wife is considered the mother?" In other words,
might not "born to [woman X]" be understood as a shorthand expression for
"maternal filiation to [woman X]"? Such an interpretation of the new article not
only avoids the absurdity to which the other possible interpretation leads, but
also, in contrast to that other, consistently furthers the article's purpose. See LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 10 (2006) ("When the language of the law is susceptible of
different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best
conforms to the purpose of the law.").
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Art. 189. Time limit for
disavowal by the husband
A suit for disavowal of
paternity must be filed within one
year after the husband learned or
should have learned of the birth of
the child; but, if the husband for
reasons beyond his control is not
able to file suit timely, then the
time for filing suit shall be
suspended during the period of
such inability.
Nevertheless, the suit may be
filed within one year from the
date the husband is notified in
writing that a party in interest has
asserted that the husband is the
father of the child, if the husband
lived continuously separate and
apart from the mother during the
three hundred days immediately
preceding the birth of the child.
30. Glossa on NA 189 "in toto."
Art. 189. Time limit for
disavowal by the husband
30
The action for disavowal of
paternity is subject to a liberative
prescription3' of one year.32 This
prescription commences to run
from the day the husband learns
or should have learned of the birth
of the child.3
Nevertheless, if the husband
lived separate and apart from the
mother continuously during the
three hundred days immediately
preceding the birth of the child,
this prescription does not
commence to run until the
husband is notified in writing that
a party in interest has asserted that
the husband is the father of the
child.34
For the most part, NA 189 simply
reproduces the substance of OA 189. There is, however, at least one exception
to this generalization, that is, one respect in which NA 189 changes OA 189.
See infra note 31 (a).
31. Glossae on liberative prescription ....
a. Unlike the delay period that OA 189 gave the presumed father for
bringing his disavowal action, which the jurisprudence had concluded was
"peremptive," see, e.g., Pounds v. Schori, 377 So. 2d 1195, 1200 (La. 1979), the
delay period that NA 189 gives him for that purpose is "prescriptive." The
significance of this change has to do with whether the running of the time period
can be interrupted, suspended, or renounced: whereas prescription is susceptible
of interruption, suspension, or renunciation, peremption is not. See LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 3461 (2006).
b. In tallying up the various possible causes for suspending the liberative
prescription established by the first paragraph of NA 198, one will no longer
need to include that of Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:305, which had
provided as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Civ. Code art. 189 and for the sole
purpose of determining the proper payor in child support cases, if the
husband, or legal father who is presumed to be the father of the child,
erroneously believed, because of misrepresentation, fraud, or deception
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by the mother, that he was the father of the child, then the time for
filing suit for disavowal of paternity shall be suspended during the
period of such erroneous belief or for ten years, whichever ends first.
In 2006 Act 344, the legislature abrogated this revised statute.
32. Glossa on one year. Though NA 189 changes the nature of the delay
period within which the presumed father must bring his disavowal action, see
supra note 31(a), it does not change the length of that delay period. As was true
under OA 189, so also under NA 189-the delay lasts "one year."
33. Glossae on [tihis prescription commences to run from the day the
husband learns or should have learned of the birth of the child.
a. Just as NA 189 does not change the length of the delay period, it also
does not change the trigger that starts the period running. Under NA 189, as
under OA 189, the period starts running as soon as-but no sooner than-when
the presumed father learns of the child's birth.
b. The "knowledge" of the child's birth that is required to trigger the
running of the period may be either subjective/actual ("learns") or
objective/constructive ("should have learned"). The following hypothetical
illustrates this latter possibility. While X and Y, wife and husband, respectively,
are still living together, they learn that X is pregnant and, further, is by then
"three months" into her pregnancy. Three months later (six months into the
pregnancy), X and Y, who have since had a falling out, separate. Y, to "get
away from it all," takes an extended work assignment out of the country. Three
months later (nine months into the pregnancy), X gives birth to the child, Z. Y
does not actually learn of Z's birth until he returns to Louisiana some fifteen
months later. Under these circumstances, Y's right to disavow paternity of Z
will have prescribed. Though he had no actual knowledge of Z's birth until
recently, Y will be charged with constructive knowledge of the birth as of the
latest possible date on which, given what he knew about the progress of the
pregnancy when he had last seen X, he could have expected Z to have been
born. Because Y knew, when he had last seen X, that she was then already six
months along and, further, knew or should have known that the normal length of
human gestation is, at the outside, 280 days from conception, the latest he could
have expected Z to have been born would have been three and a half months or
so after he had last seen X. Since that time, more than a year has passed.
34. Glossa on NA 189 paragraph 2 "in toto." NA 189 paragraph 2
reproduces the substance of OA 189 paragraph 2 with only slight stylistic
variations.
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Art. 190. Time limit for
disavowal by heir or legatee
If the husband dies within the
delays for filing suit to disavow
paternity without having instituted
such action, an heir or legatee
whose interest in the succession
will be reduced shall have one
year from the death or one year
from the birth of the child,
whichever is longer, within which
to bring such an action.
Nevertheless, the heir or
legatee may file suit within one
year from the date the heir or
legatee is notified in writing that a
party in interest has asserted that
the husband is the father of the
child, if the husband lived
continuously separate and apart
from the mother during the three
hundred days immediately
preceding the birth of the child.
Art. 190. Time limit for
disavowal by heir or legatee
35
If the prescription has
commenced to run and the
husband dies 36  before the
prescription has accrued,37 his
successor whose interest is
adversely affected may institute
an action for disavowal of
paternity. The action of the
successor is subject to a liberative
prescription of one year. This
prescription commences to run
from the day of the death of the
husband.38
If the prescription has not yet
commenced to run, the action of
the successor is subject to a
liberative prescription of one year.
This prescription commences to
run from the day the successor is
notified in writing that a party in
interest has asserted that the
husband is the father of the
child3 9
35. Glossae on NA 190 "in toto."
a. Like OA 190, NA 190 permits certain persons who, upon the death of
the presumed father, succeed to his interests to bring the disavowal action
posthumously in his stead. To this extent, NA 190 does not change the law.
b. Unlike OA 190, which had referred to an "heir or legatee" of the
presumed father, NA 190 refers to a "successor" of the presumed father. This
change in terminology does not import a change in the law. Since at least 1981,
the Civil Code has used "successor" as an umbrella term that covers both "heirs"
(also called "intestate successors") and "legatees" ("testate successors"). See
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 876 (2006). The substitution of "successor" for "heir
or legatee," then, simply brings the terminology of the rule in line with more
modern usage.
c. If one were to follow "general principles," then one would permit anyone
and everyone who has an interest in doing so to challenge any and every
presumption of paternity, even those that arise from marriage (e.g., those
established by NAs 185 and 186). See Laurent, supra note 1, No. 435, at 548
("In general, all those who have an interest [therein] can bring actions
concerning the status of persons. That is the application of the common law.").
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In regard to the presumptions of paternity that arise from marriage, however, the
legislature has chosen to depart from general principles. See id.' ("The
legislation derogates [from this common law] for the action en desaveu.").
Recognizing that the presumed father in such a case has a uniquely personal
stake in whether the presumption stands or falls, the legislature has, in principle,
restricted the class of persons who may challenge the presumption to the father
alone. See, e.g., Baudry-Lacantinerie, supra note 1, No. 541, at 447 ("It is also
necessary to consider it [the right to disavow] as attached exclusively to the
person of the husband."); Planiol, supra note 1, No. 785, at 656 ("The action en
desaveu belongs, in principle, only to the husband.") & No. 788, at 658 ("The
exclusive attribution of the action en desaveu to the husband does not permit any
exception other than those that have just been indicated [e.g., the exception in
favor of the presumed father's successors]."); Laurent, supra note 1, No. 435, at
548-50 ("This action belongs, in principle, only to the husband .... Even to his
successors, the action does not pass in full right . . . .Article 1166, which
authorizes the creditors to exercise the rights and actions of their debtor, except
those that are exclusively attached to the person. We will see, under the title 'Of
Obligations,' that the legislation means by this non-material [moral] rights and
those in which the immaterial element predominates over the pecuniary interest.
Now, disavowal is essentially a non-material right: that decides the question.")
& 551-52 ("It will be said that we prove too much, that the legislation gives the
action to the successors .... That is, in the end, an exceptional disposition. .. .");
see also Carbonnier, supra note 1, at 234 ("The plaintiff [in a disavowal action]
is, in principle, the husband, and him alone. . . .") (emphasis added). But what
the legislature "hath taken away" it nevertheless "hath given back" in some
small measure, by way of various "exceptions to the exception." One of these
exceptions to the exception-that in favor of the presumed father's
"successors"-is found here in NA 190; the other-that in favor of the child's
mother-is found in NA 191.
i. (1) Under the reformulated limitations of NA 190, the particulars of the
limitations vary somewhat depending on whether, as of the time of the presumed
father's death, prescription on the presumed father's own right to disavow
paternity had begun to run. If it had, then the successor's rights are governed by
the first paragraph of NA 190; if it had not, then the successor's rights are
governed by the second paragraph of NA 190.
(2) This notion-that the limitations applicable to the successor's
disavowal rights should vary depending on whether prescription had begun to
run on the presumed father's disavowal rights-is "new," at least in the sense
that it had not been explicitly set forth in the text of OA 190. But this notion
had, in fact, been there in OA 190, if only behind the text. For under OA 190,
the successor had faced one set of limitations if prescription had begun to run on
the presumed father's disavowal rights and another if it had not. Thus, the
introduction of this notion into the text of NA 190 does not, in reality, change
the law.
ii. (1) Though the limitations rules of the first paragraph of NA 190 differ
from those of the second in certain respects, they do not differ in all respects.
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To the contrary, those two sets of rules share two points in common: in one as in
the other, the successor's disavowal rights are subject to a "liberative
prescription," and the period of this prescription is "one year." That this is so
becomes clear when one juxtaposes the second sentence of the first paragraph of
NA 190--"[t]he action of the successor is subject to a liberative prescription of
one year"-which governs the first case, against the second clause of the first
sentence of the second paragraph of NA 190---"the action of the successor is
subject to a liberative prescription of one year"-which governs the second case.
Thus, whatever may differentiate the two cases, it is neither the nature of the
limitations period nor its length.
(2) In terms of their relationship to the "common elements" of the
limitations rules of OA 190, the common elements of the limitations rules of NA
190 are a "mixed bag." Consider, first, the nature of the limitations period. On
this point, the law has been changed. Whereas under NA 190 it is
"prescriptive," under OA 190 it had been "peremptive." Consider, next, the
length of the period. On this point, the law has not been changed: as is true now
under NA 190, under OA 190 the length of period was set at one year.
iii. (1) If the two sets of limitations rules found in the first and second
paragraphs of NA 190 do not differ in terms of the nature of the limitations
period or its length, then how do they differ? The difference lies in the trigger
that starts the one-year prescriptive period running. See infra notes 38, 39.
(2) This "difference" between the two sets of limitations rules is not
new. As is true now under NA 190, under QA 190 the real difference between
the two sets of rules had lain in the trigger.
36. Glossa on dies .... Just like the term "death" as used in OA 190, the
term "death" as used in NA 190 undoubtedly refers not only to actual death, see
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (2000 & Supp. 2006), but also to presumed death,
see, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 30, 54 (2006).
37. Glossa on [if the prescription has commenced to run and the husband
dies before the prescription has accrued. . .. If, at the time of the presumed
father's death, prescription on the presumed father's own right to disavow
paternity had already begun to run, then the presumed father's successor can
bring a disavowal action only if, at the time of the presumed father's death,
prescription on the presumed father's own right to disavow paternity had not
also finished running. If that is not so, i.e., if the presumed father's own right to
disavow paternity had prescribed before the presumed father died, then the
presumed father's successor will be precluded from bringing a disavowal action.
On this point, NA 190 does not change the law.
38. Glossa on [tihis prescription commences to run from the day of the
death of the husband. Under NA 190 the trigger for the one-year prescriptive
period is the date of the presumed father's death where prescription had not
already begun to run against the presumed father's right to disavow before his
death. This "trigger rule" changes the law in part. In contrast to NA 190, which
establishes a single trigger in such cases-the date of the presumed father's
death--OA 190 had established two alternative triggers: the date of the
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presumed father's death or the date of the child's birth, whichever was later.
NA 190 lacks this second alternative trigger.
39. Glossa on [tJhis prescription commences to run from the day the
successor is notified in writing that a party in interest has asserted that the
husband is the father of the child. NA 190 provides that where prescription had
already begun to run against the presumed father's right to disavow before the
presumed father's death, the trigger for the one-year prescriptive period is the
date on which the successor is notified in writing that someone who has an
interest in doing so has claimed that the presumed father was the father in fact.
This provision merely reformulates the second paragraph of OA 190. See supra
note 35(c)(i)-(iii). On this point, then, NA 190 does not change the law.
No corresponding subsection Subsection C. Contestation and
heading I Establishment of Paternity
40
40. Glossae on Subsection C. Contestation and Establishment of Paternity.
a. The heading of this subsection, like its content, is entirely new.
b. The articles in this section, NAs 191-94, break new ground in Louisiana
legal history by permitting someone other than the husband of the mother or his
successor to rebut the presumption pater is est quem nuptiae demonstrant. This
"someone other" is the child's mother.
c. Inspiration for these new articles was drawn from several foreign law
sources, as comment (a) to NA 191 reveals. See French CODE CIVIL arts. 318
(repealed 2006) ("Even in the absence of disavowal, the mother can contest the
paternity of the husband, but only for the purpose of legitimating the child,
where, after the dissolution of the marriage, she has married the true father of
the child.") & 318.1 (repealed 2006) ("On pain of its being dismissed, the action
that is conducted against the husband or his heirs is joined to a demand for
legitimation formed before the court of grand instance. It must be introduced by
the mother and her new spouse within six months of their marriage and before
the child has attained the age of seven years."); UNn:. PARENTAGE ACT § 6(a), 9
U.L.A. 410-11 (1973) ("A child, his natural mother, or a man presumed to be
his father under Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Section 4(a), may bring an action...
(2) for the purpose of declaring the non-existence of the father and child
relationship presumed under Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Section 4(a) only if the
action is brought within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant
facts, but in no event later than [five] years after the child's birth. After the
presumption has been rebutted, paternity of the child by another man may be
determined in the same action, if he has been made a party."); Quebec. CIVIL
CODE art. 531 ("Any interested person, including the father or the mother, may,
by any means, contest the filiation of a person .... "); CALIF. FAM. CODE §
7630(2) ("For the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father and child
relationship presumed under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 7611 only if
the action is brought within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of
relevant facts. After the presumption has been rebutted, paternity of the child by
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another man may be determined in the same action, if he has been made a
party."). Even a casual comparison of NAs 191-94, on the one hand, and these
various sources, on the other, reveals that one of the sources was far more
influential than the others, namely, the French Code Civil articles.
d The list of the sources of the new articles given in comment (a) to NA
191 is incomplete. The author of the comment should have listed not only
articles 318 and 318.1, but also article 318.2, of the French Code Civil.- That
third article reads as follows: "The two demands are disposed of by one and the
same judgment, which cannot accept the contestation of paternity [of the first
husband] unless the legitimation [as to the second husband] is admitted."
French CODE CIVIL art. 318.2 (repealed 2006).
e. In terms of the mass of foreign civil law legislation that permits the
mother to contest paternity, that cited in the comment is just the tip of the
iceberg. See, e.g., Belgian CODE CIVIL art. 332 1 ("Paternity established by
means of [the presumptions of paternity] can be contested by the husband, by
the mother, and by the child."); Dutch CIVIL CODE art. 198(1). By a declaration
made before the officer of civil status, the mother can disavow that a child born
to her within 306 days of the dissolution of the marriage is that of her former
husband, on the condition that another man recognizes the child .... If the
marriage is dissolved by death, the mother can make this declaration only if she
was legally separated from or lived separate and apart from her deceased
husband from the 306th day before the birth of the child."); German
BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 1600 ("The following persons are entitled to
contest paternity: 1. The man whose paternity stands according to [the
presumptions of paternity] . . . 3. The mother and 4. The child."); Italian
CODICE CIVILE art. 235 6 ("The action of disrecognition can be exercised by
the mother or by the child, once he has attained major status, in all cases in
which it can be exercised by the father."); Portuguese C6DIGO CIVIL art. 1839(1)
("The paternity of the child can be impugned by the husband of the mother, by
the other, or by the child, or . . . by the Public Minister."); Spanish C6DIGO
CIVIL art. 137 2 (Julio Romanach, Jr. trans., 1994) ("The [child's] right to
bring the action [to disavow paternity], in the interest of a minor or incapacitated
child, pertains, in the same manner, during the year following the recordation of
filiation, to the mother with parental authority.. ").
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No corresponding article Art. 191. Contestation and
establishment of paternity by
mother4'
The mother of a child42 may
institute an action to establish
both that her former husband is
not the father of the child43 and
that her present husband is the
father.44, 45 This action may be
instituted only if the present
husband has acknowledged the
child by authentic act or by
signing the birth certificate.
46
41. Glossae onNA 191 "in toto."
a. NA 191 is entirely new. It changes the law.
b. Though it is likely that, in the course of time, the action established in
and regulated by this and the succeeding articles of Subchapter 3 will come to be
referred to as simply the "contestation action" (the comments to the articles use
this shorthand expression), one should be aware that that term, as used in
reference to this action, is something of a misnomer. To contest something is to
engage in an act that is negative-to show that something is not-and
destructive---'to tear something down." To be sure, the action entails such an
element, for the plaintiff must establish that a certain man is not the child's
father or, what amounts to the same thing, must tear down the presumptive bond
of filiation between that man and the child. But the action also entails-and, by
law, has to entail-something more, an additional element, one that is
affirmative and constructive. To be specific, the plaintiff must prove that a
certain other man is the child's father or, what amounts to the same thing, must
"build up" an actual bond of filiation between that other man and the child.
Without this affirmative-constructive element, the action is incomplete. In the
interest of accuracy, then, it might be better to refer to the NA 191 action as one
of "contestation and establishment." See French CODE CIv1L art. 318 (repealed
2006) ("Even in the absence of disavowal, the mother can contest the paternity
of the husband, but only for the purpose of legitimating the child, where, after
the dissolution of the marriage, she has married the true father of the child.").
42. Glossa on [tihe mother of a child . . . . The "contestation and
establishment" action is available only to the mother herself. It may not be
brought by anyone else, not even the mother's successors.
This conclusion rests on two interrelated considerations, both of them
exegetical arguments. First, as has already been noted, see supra note 40(b), the
rule that the mother may contest the presumption that her former husband is the
father of her child represents a new and extraordinary departure from the old and
once absolute, but now merely general, rule that only the husband (or one of his
successors) could challenge that presumption. As an exceptional provision, this
2007] GLOSSAE ON THE NEWLA W OFFILIATION 419
rule must be strictly construed. Exceptio est strictissimae interpretationis. The
text of NA 191 mentions only the mother; it says nothing about her successors.
Second, given that the legislature, in the case of the disavowal action established
by NAs 187-90, specifically provided that the action can be brought by the
presumed father's successors, see NA 190, but, in the case of the "contestation
and establishment" action remained silent on this point, it follows a contrario
that the legislature did not want to make the same provision for the latter as it
had for the former.
43. Glossa on that her former husband is not the father of the child. This
language clearly presupposes that the would-be plaintiff-mother finds herself in
the face of circumstances in which her former husband is presumed to be the
child's father. And, in this regard, there are only two possibilities: (1) the child
was born during her marriage to her former husband; or (2) the child was born
within 300 days of the dissolution of her marriage to her former husband. See
NAs 185, 186.
44. Glossa on NA 191 sentence 1 "in toto." When one considers the first
sentence of NA 191 as a whole, it becomes clear that the circumstances in which
the "contestation and establishment" action is available are narrow indeed.
These circumstances include: (1) that the plaintiff-mother has been twice
married; (2) that she is no longer married to her first husband and is still married
to her second; (3) that her first husband is presumed to be the child's father per
NA 185 or 186; and (4) that her second husband is, in fact, the child's father.
45. Glossa on her present husband is the father. To carry the affirmative-
constructive element of her burden of proof, see supra note 41(b), the plaintiff
must show not that just any man is the child's father, but that the very man who
is her new husband is the child's father. If she has happened to take as her new
husband a man other than the child's father, then she will not be in a position to
bring the "contestation and establishment" action.
46. Glossae on acknowledged the child by authentic act or by signing the
birth certificate.
a. On "acknowledgment" by these means, which was formerly and still is
known as "formal acknowledgment," see NA 196.
b. It might be (and, indeed, has been) argued that the requirement of NA
191 that the child be acknowledged by authentic act or by signing the birth
certificate contradicts the requirements of formal acknowledgment as set out in
NA 196. The supposed contradiction consists of this: that whereas NA 196
limits acknowledgment by authentic act or by signing the birth certificate to a
child who is not already paternally filiated, thereby impliedly forbidding such an
acknowledgment where the child is already paternally filiated, NA 191 permits
such an acknowledgment for a child who, by definition, is already paternally
filiated, in particular, is filiated to the mother's first husband.
This argument rests on a misunderstanding of the point of NA 196 and of
the point of NA 191 sentence 2. In truth, neither provision is concerned to limit,
forbid, or permit formal acknowledgments in this or that set of circumstances, at
least not in the sense in which those terms are used in this argument. No, the
point of these provisions is to specify the varying effects of formal
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acknowledgments made in certain varying circumstances. The point of NA 196
may, then, be expressed this way: (1) If the child who is formally acknowledged
is not already filiated to another man, then the acknowledgment gives rise to a
presumption that the acknowledger is the child's father. (2) But if that child is
already filiated to another man, then the acknowledgment has no such effect.
Similarly, the point of NA 191 sentence 2 may be expressed this way: If the
husband of the mother has formally acknowledged a child that is presumptively
filiated to the mother's ex-husband, then the mother may bring a "contestation
and establishment" action to rebut the presumption that her ex-husband is the
child's father and to prove that her new husband is the father. Thus, whereas
NA 196 specifies one effect for a formal acknowledgment made under one set of
circumstances, NA 191 sentence 2 specifies a different effect for a formal
acknowledgment made under another set of circumstances. Between these
propositions there is, of course, no contradiction whatsoever.
No corresponding article Art. 192. Contestation action;
proof
The mother shall prove by
clear and convincing evidence
both that her former husband is
not the father and that her present
husband is the father.47  The
testimony of the mother shall be
corroborated by other evidence.4
47. Glossa on NA 191 sentence 1 "in toto." The contesting mother must
prove both (1) that her former husband is not the father, and (2) that her new
husband is the father. Proof of this first fact, by itself, is insufficient. This two-
fold burden of proof corresponds to, indeed, flows out of, the two-fold nature of
the "contestation and establishment" action itself, which, as was noted earlier, is
not only an action to contest the paternity of one man, but also an action to
establish the paternity of another. See NA 191; see also supra note 41; French
CODE CIVIL art. 318.1 1 (repealed 2006) ("On pain of its being dismissed, the
action that is conducted against the husband or his heirs is joined to a demand
for legitimation formed before the court of grand instance.").
48. Glossa on NA 191 sentence 2 "in toto." Just as the (self-serving)
testimony of the presumed father is insufficient for an avowal action, see NA
187 sentence 2, so also, the (self-serving) testimony of the mother is insufficient
for a "contestation and establishment" action. In both cases, the rationale behind
the rule is the same. See supra note 27(a).
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No corresponding article Art. 193. Contestation and
establishment of paternity; time
period
The action by the mother
shall be instituted within a
peremptive period 49  of one
hundred eighty days from the
marriage to her present husband
and also within two years from
the day of the birth of the child,5°
except as may otherwise be
provided by law.
5 1
49. Glossa on [tjhe action by the mother shall be instituted within a
peremptive period .... The temporal limitations established in this new article
are peremptive, not liberative. For the significance of this designation, see
supra note 31 (a).
50. Glossa on within ... one hundred eighty days from the marriage to
her present husband and also within two years from the day of the birth of the
child .... Despite the use of the singular number here-"period" rather than
"periods"-there are, in fact, two peremptive periods for the "contestation and
establishment" action, both of which must be satisfied (that is to say, they are
cumulative rather than alternative). The mother must bring the action (1) within
180 days of the day on which her current marriage was contracted, and (2)
within two years of the day on which the child was born. If the mother brings
the action within two years of the day on which the child was bom, but later
than 180 days from the day on which her marriage was contracted, or within 180
days of the day on which her marriage was contracted, but later than two years
from the day on which the child was born, then her action is perempted. See
French CODE CIVIL art. 318.1 2 (repealed 2006) ("It [the contestation action]
must be introduced by the mother and her new spouse within six months of their
marriage and before the child has attained the age of seven years.").
51. Glossa on except as may otherwise be provided by law. This provision
seems to be a vestige of an early version of the Projet, one in which some
exception to the general rule of NA 193 had been proposed, set out, no doubt, in
some proposed new revised statute. That proposed new revised statute,
however, did not make it into the final version of the Projet. When it was
rejected, this provision of NA 193 should have been removed. That it was not is
undoubtedly the result of an oversight. In any event, this provision is, at present,
superfluous.
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No corresponding article Art. 194. Judgment in
contestation action
A judgment shall not be
rendered decreeing that the
former husband is not the father
of the child unless the judgment
also decrees that the present
husband is the father of the
child.52
52. Glossae on NA 194 "in toto."
a. The judgment in the "contestation and establishment" action must
contain two elements: (1) that the mother's former husband is not the father; and
(2) that the mother's new husband is the father. A judgment consisting of the
first element alone would be defective. This two-fold judgment requirement
corresponds to, indeed, flows out of, the two-fold nature of the "contestation and
establishment" action itself, which, as noted earlier, is not only an action to
contest the paternity of one man but also an action to establish the paternity of
another. See NA 191; see also supra note 41; French CODE CIVIL art. 318.2
(repealed 2006) ("The two demands are disposed of by one and the same
judgment, which cannot accept the contestation of paternity [of the first
husband] unless the legitimation [as to the second husband] is admitted.").
b. The judgment that the mother's new husband is the child's father can, of
course, be "invoked" not only on behalf of the child, but also on behalf of the
new husband. Under the new law of filiation, it is only "presumptions," as
opposed to "judgments," whose "invocability" is ever "relativized" and then
only in one instance, namely, under NA 196. See infra note 74.
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Art. 198. Legitimation by
subsequent marriage of parents
Illegitimate children are
legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of their father and mother,
whenever the latter have formally
or informally acknowledged them
as their children, either before or
after the marriage.
Art. 199. Rights of children
legitimated by subsequent
marriage
Children legitimated by
subsequent marriage are legitimate.
Art. 195., Presumption by
marriage and acknowledgment;
child not filiated to another
man; proof; time period
A man who marries54 the
mother of a child not filiated to
another man 55 and who, with the
concurrence of the mother,56
acknowledges57 the child by
authentic act 58 or by signing the
birth certificate59 is presumed to
be the father of that child.6°'6'
The husband may disavow
paternity of the child62  as
provided in Article 187.63
The action for disavowal is
subject to a peremptive period 64 of
one hundred eighty days.65 This
peremptive period commences to
run from the day of the marriage or
the acknowledgment, whichever
occurs later.66
53. Glossa on NA 195 "in toto." This article reproduces in re-
conceptualized form the ancient institution of "legitimation by subsequent
marriage plus acknowledgment." This institution, a Roman imperial innovation,
see Codex Just. 5.27.5, that was later taken up and extended by the canonists,
see the Decretal of Pope Alexander III entitled "Extra qui filii sint legitime,"
and Toullier, supra note 1, No. 919, at 214, has been a part of Louisiana's law of
filiation from the beginning. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 217 (1825); LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 21 (1808); LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, part. IV, tit. XIII, law 1; Codex
Just. 5.27.5; see also Charles Giraud, PRECIS DE L'ANCIEN DROIT COUTUMIER
FRANCAIS 14-15 (2d ed. 1875) (noting that the institution of legitimation by
subsequent marriage plus acknowledgment was recognized in the law of le pays
de droit coutumier during the ancien r~gime). The "re-conceptualization" that
the institution has undergone in the Revision consists of this: whereas
"subsequent marriage plus acknowledgment" was formerly understood to be a
mode of "legitimating" an illegitimate child, it is now understood to be simply a
mode of "filiating" an un-filiated child.
54. Glossa on marries .... On the meaning of the term "marriage" as it is
used in NA 195 and the rest of the Revision, see supra note 18.
55. Glossae on a child not filiated to another man ....
424 LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 67
a. The presumption created by NA 195 arises only if the child in question
is not already filiated to another man. This restriction on the scope of the
presumption changes the law or, at the very least, the regnant jurisprudential
interpretation of the law.
As OA 198 (1948) had been (mis)interpreted by the jurisprudence, the
mode of legitimation established therein could operate not only in favor of a
child who was not yet filiated to another man, but also in favor of a child who
was already filiated to another man, indeed, was already another man's
"legitimate" child. See, e.g., Succession of Mitchell, 323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975)
(child who was presumed to be the legitimate child of the first husband of the
mother per the presumption pater is est . .became legitimated as to the
mother's second husband where the second husband, after marrying her,
acknowledged the child). In such a situation, the courts ruled, the child enjoyed
dual paternity, that is, had not one, but two, fathers.
Thanks to the insertion of the restriction "a child not filiated to another
man" into NA 195, it is no longer possible for "subsequent marriage plus
acknowledgment" to result in dual paternity. Under this article, a man who
marries a woman whose child is already filiated to another man and
acknowledges that child as his own does not thereby filiate that child to himself.
To the contrary, such a child remains filiated to one man and one man only-the
man to whom the child had theretofore been filiated.
b. It is clear that if, at the time at which the "subsequent marriage plus
acknowledgment" takes place, the child in question is already filiated to another
man, then the presumption of filiation established by NA 195 is not triggered at
that time. There is, however, another case in which the correct solution is not so
clear. Suppose that, at the time at which the "subsequent marriage plus
acknowledgment" takes place, the child is then filiated to another man, but that
after the time at which the "subsequent marriage plus acknowledgment" takes
place, the child becomes un-filiated to that other man. In such a case, will the
presumption of paternity established by NA 195 arise?
Before I try to resolve this question, let me first explain how such a
seemingly strange transformation in the child's filiation status might take place.
In order for the child to be filiated to another man, either of two things must be
true: (1) he must be presumed to be the child of another man, see NAs 184, 185,
195, 196; or (2) he must have been adjudged to be the child of another man, see
NAS 197, 198. If the prior filiation arose in the former of these two ways (i.e.,
by presumption), then the prior filiation can and will cease if ever the
presumption on which the prior filiation rests is rebutted. Consider this
example. Child C is born to woman Y who is then married to man X. Six
months later, X and Y are divorced. Immediately thereafter Y marries man Z,
who promptly acknowledges C as his own child. At that moment, the NA 195
presumption has not been triggered, for C is still presumed to be the child of X.
But suppose that X then brings a successful disavowal action against C. Once
that judgment is rendered, the child will no longer be "filiated to another man."
In short, the child will have gone from being "filiated to another man" before his
mother's remarriage to un-filiated to anotheftman after his mother's remarriage.
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At that point, should we say that the child, per NA 195, is now presumed to be
the child of Z?
In resolving the question presented here, there would seem to be two
possibilities. First, it may be that the child being un-"filiated to another man"
must occur at a particular time, namely, at the moment at which his mother
marries the man who has acknowledged him. In that case, a post-marriage
change on the part of the child from filiated to another man to un-"filiated to
another man" would be of no moment. The child would remain outside the
ambit of NA 195. Second, it may be that the time at which the child is un-
"filiated to another man" is a matter of indifference, so long as, at some point,
the child's being un-filiated to another man coincides temporally with his
mother's being married to a man who has acknowledged him. Which alternative
represents the correct interpretation of NA 195?
For several reasons, I favor the alternative of indifference. First, there is an
exegetical argument: neither the text of NA 195 nor that of any other legislation
requires, by its terms, that the child already be un-filiated to another man before
the marriage and/or the acknowledgment. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguere debemus. Second, there is what might be called a "logical-analytic"
argument. In principle, a court judgment that a presumption of filiation has been
rebutted has retroactive effects; in other words, when such a judgment is
rendered, the child is deemed never to have been filiated or, to put it another
way, to have been un-filiated from the beginning. In regard to the rebuttal of
presumptions based on marriage, see Bdnabent, supra note 1, No. 623, at 354
("When the disavowal action succeeds, the effect of the judgment is to set aside
very line of filiation between the husband of the mother and the child of the
mother. This exclusion is, one must understand, retroactive: the child is thought
never to have been related to the husband of his mother . . ... "). See also
Carbonnier, supra note 1, at 236 ("The judgment [of disavowal] is declarative
and, therefore, retroactive; legitimacy disappears ab ovo, from the egg. .. .");
Mazeaud, supra note 1, No. 906, at 301 ("The disavowed child loses the
character of a legitimate child. He becomes, retroactively, from the moment of
his conception, a 'natural child' [i.e., illegitimate child] of his mother. . . ."). In
regard to presumptions based on acknowledgment, see Bdnabent, supra note 1,
No. 681, 382 ("If the action [to contest an acknowledgment] is successful, the
line of filiation is retroactively annihilated .... "); Courbe, supra note 1, No.
809, at 319 ("A judgment upholding the contestation [of an acknowledgment],
just like a judgment that upholds an action for annulment [of an
acknowledgment], has the effect of retroactively annihilating the line of filiation
that had been established between the child and the author of the
acknowledgment."); Planiol, supra note 1, No. 847, at 715 ("The annulment of
an acknowledgment on the ground that it was a 'lie' has the effect of
retroactively breaking the line of filiation that resulted from it . . . ."). If that is
so, then one can say, in reference to the hypothetical case I posed above and
others like it (that is to say, cases in which, after the child is acknowledged, the
presumption that another man was the child's father ends up being rebutted),
that the child was not, after all, filiated to another man when the
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acknowledgment was made; indeed, that the child had never been filiated to
another man. In short, the fiction of retroactivity takes care of the temporal
problem by eliminating it.
56. Glossa on with the concurrence of the mother. The acknowledgment
required under NA 195 is effective only if the mother concurs in it. Because the
article says nothing about what, if any, form this concurrence must take, one
must suppose that the question is governed by general principles. Insofar as the
form ofjuridical acts is concerned, the general rule is that of consensualism, that
is, the act is considered to be complete and effective merely by consent, without
the actor's needing to express this consent in any particular form. Jean
Carbonnier, DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION No. 168, at 270 (22d ed. 1994); Satil
Litvinoff & W. Thomas Tete, LOUISIANA LEGAL TRANSACTIONS: THE CIVIL
LAW OF JURIDICAL ACTS 127-28 (1969); Henri Mazeaud & Leon Mazeaud et al.,
LEQONS DE DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION A L'ETUDE DU DROIT No. 266, at 394
(Frangois Chabas rev., 12th ed. 2000). Whatever else the mother's concurrence
may be, it is undoubtedly a juridical act. See NA 195 cmt. (e). It would seem,
then, that the mother's concurrence could be oral or even implied.
57. Glossae on acknowledges ....
a. One of the most significant differences between the old institution of
legitimation by "subsequent marriage plus acknowledgment" and the new
institution of filiation by "subsequent marriage plus acknowledgment" lies in the
recognized means of acknowledgment. Under OA 198, there were two
possibilities: the acknowledgment could be either formal or informal. The
former required the acknowledger to do one of three things: (1) make out an
authentic act of acknowledgment; (2) sign the child's birth certificate; or (3) sign
the baptismal registry for the child. The latter required the acknowledger to
engage in some behavior whereby he held the child out to the community as his
own. Under NA 195, the possibilities are much more limited, and this at two
levels. First, the second possibility noted above-informal acknowledgment-
has been suppressed entirely. Second, thanks to the revisers' redefinition of
formal acknowledgment, about which I shall have more to say later, see infra
note 71(a), the first possibility noted above-formal acknowledgment-has
been narrowed in that the alternative of formal acknowledgment by signing the
baptismal registry has been suppressed. Thus, for "subsequent marriage plus
acknowledgment" to produce its effects under NA 195, the acknowledgment
must be formal, which, as that term is now defined, means that it must be done
by authentic act or by birth certificate.
b. Though the authority on this point is, I admit, indirect at best, it seems
clear to me that an acknowledgment that is false can have no effect under NA
195. The doctrine and jurisprudence that have interpreted OA 203, which
provided for filiation by formal acknowledgment, have concluded that a false
acknowledgment is no acknowledgment at all, that it is, to the contrary, an
absolute nullity and, as such, produces no filiative effects. See infra note 76(a).
As I will explain later on, this interpretation of that old article has been carried
over into the new article that replaces it, NA 196. See id. Because formal
acknowledgment, as outlined in NA 196, is an element of filiation by
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"subsequent marriage plus acknowledgment," as outlined in NA 195, what is
true of formal acknowledgment under the former must in general be true of
formal acknowledgment under the latter.
58. Glossa on authentic act .... On the meaning of authentic act, see infra
note 71 (b)(i).
59. Glossa on signing the birth certificate .... On the meaning of "signing
the birth certificate," see infra note 71 (b)(ii).
60. Glossa on is presumed to be the father of that child. Under NA 195,
"subsequent marriage plus acknowledgment" gives rise to a "presumption" that
the subsequent-marrier/acknowledger is the father of the child. In this regard,
NA 195 changes the law, or at least the prevailing interpretation of the law. As
the jurisprudence had (mis)interpreted OA 195, "subsequent marriage plus
acknowledgement" did not give rise to such a presumption. See, e.g., Chatelain
v. State, 586 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1991) (man who, after the birth of a child, married
the child's mother and acknowledged the child was nevertheless not presumed
to be the child's father). In revising OA 195, the revisers deliberately chose to
repudiate the Chatelain rule.
61. Glossa on NA 195 paragraph 1 "in toto." Filiation by "subsequent
marriage plus acknowledgment," obviously enough, requires (1) a marriage
subsequent to the child's birth, and (2) acknowledgment of the child. But there
is no requirement that these two events take place in any particular order. It is
possible and, one would suppose will usually be the case, that the subsequent
marriage will precede the acknowledgment. But it is also possible that the
acknowledgment will precede the marriage. In either case, the requirements of
NA 195 paragraph 1 will be satisfied.
The rationale that leads me to this conclusion is as follows. First, there is an
exegetical argument. Neither the text of NA 195 paragraph 1 nor of any piece of
legislation, by its terms, requires that the subsequent marriage and the
acknowledgment take place in any particular order. Second, there is an
historical argument. OA 195 expressly provided that the required
acknowledgment could take place "either before or after the marriage." See
Henry v. Jean, 112 So. 2d 171, 174-75 (La. App. 1st Cir.), aff'd, 115 So. 2d 363
(La. 1959); Oppenheim, supra note 1, at 339-40. Though those who created
NA 195, did, as I have already explained, intend to change a number of the
elements of OA 195, nothing in the relevant legislative history (including the
records of the Institute) indicates that this element-that the subsequent
marriage and acknowledgment can occur in any sequence-was among them.
62. Glossae on [t]he husband may disavow paternity of the child as
provided in Article 187.
a. Having provided that "subsequent marriage plus acknowledgment"
would henceforth give rise to a presumption of paternity, the revisers then went
on to provide that this presumption of paternity, like all the others, could be
rebutted. The procedural vehicle provided for the rebuttal of this presumption is
the same as that provided for the rebuttal of the others: a disavowal action. This
disavowal action, of course, is entirely new.
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b. It seems that only the subsequent-marrier/acknowledger himself, to the
exclusion of his successors and the child's mother, is permitted to rebut the
presumption of paternity established by NA 195. This surmise (I will not call it
a conclusion, for reasons I will provide in the next paragraph) rests on several
considerations, both of them exegetical arguments. First, there is the apparent
plain meaning of the terms of the text. NA 195 in haec verba speaks only of the
husband; it says nothing, not even by implication, about his successors or the
child's mother. Second, there is an a contrario argument. Given that the
legislature, in the case of the presumptions established by NAs 185 and 186,
specifically provided that the presumption action can be challenged by the
presumed father's successors and by the child's mother, but, in the case of the
presumption of paternity established by NA 195, remained silent on this point, it
follows a contrario that the legislature did not want to make the same provision
for the latter as it had for the former. Compare NA 190, and NA 191, with NA
185, and NA 186.
Though this interpretative argument is certainly plausible, I nevertheless
question whether it is correct in its entirety. If the argument is correct, then
there is a fundamental difference between the presumptions of paternity
established by NAs 185 and 186, on the one hand, and that established by NA
195, on the other: whereas the former can be challenged not only by the
presumed father himself but also by his successors and by the child's mother,
the latter can be challenged only by the presumed father, to the exclusion of his
successors and the child's mother. Insofar as the mother's right to challenge
these various presumptions is concerned, the distinction makes sense. In order
for the NA 195 presumption to arise, the mother must concur in the father's
acknowledgment, something she need not do in order for the presumptions of
NAs 185 or 186 to arise. This concurrence constitutes a confession by the
mother that the acknowledger is, in fact, the father. Since she has made such a
confession, it is perhaps appropriate, morally speaking, that she should be (if the
reader will permit me to speak as a common lawyer for a moment) "equitably
estopped" from contradicting it later on. But insofar as the right of the
presumed father's successors to challenge these various presumptions is
concerned, the distinction makes little sense, at least to my mind. One of the
reasons that the presumed father's successors are permitted to challenge the
presumption of NA 185 or NA 186, as the case might be, is to enable them to act
for the presumed father-to do what one must suppose he himself would have
done, had he still been able-in situations in which evidence that he was not, in
fact, the father comes to light only after he has died. But might not this problem
arise as well and no less in a case governed by NA 195? Suppose that the father
marries the mother and acknowledges the child in reliance on the mother's false
representation that the child is his; that the presumed father then goes to his
grave erroneously believing that the child is his; but that, after his death, it
comes out that the child was not his. Should not one assume that this man, no
less than a man presumed to be the father under NA 185 or NA 186, might have
wanted to challenge the filiative bond between the child and himself?. And, if
the answer to that question is "yes," as I think it must be, then why should not
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his successors be permitted to act for him, just as they would have been
permitted to act for him had the presumption of paternity arisen under NA 185
or NA 186 instead of NA 195? Perhaps the answer to this question is supposed
to have something to do with the fact that in a NA 195 case, the father, in
addition to being married to the mother, which is for the most part all that NA
185 and 186 require, must acknowledge the child. If he has taken this
affirmative act, then maybe that should be considered to be "his business," and
his alone, and perhaps his successors should not be allowed to "stick their noses
in it." But this explanation for the distinction, in addition to being a patent non
sequitur, is fundamentally at odds with the law of filiation by (formal)
acknowledgment, which is the subject matter of the next article (NA 196). As
we shall see when we examine that article, anyone and everyone who has an
interest in doing so, and not just the presumed father's successors, is entitled to
challenge the presumption of paternity that that article establishes. If the
presumed father's acknowledgment does not somehow "cut off" his successors'
ability to challenge the presumption under NA 196, then why should the father's
acknowledgment have such a preclusive effect under NA 195?
In view of the considerations recited above, I am forced to reach the
following conclusions. First, I am not at all sure that NA 195, properly
interpreted, precludes the presumed father's successors from challenging the
presumption of paternity that that article establishes. Yes, I acknowledge, as I
have already indicated, that the "plain meaning" of the article's text, as well as
various other exegetical considerations, suggests the contrary. But one must
never forget that the "plain meaning" rule is subject to an important exception:
one need not and, indeed, should not interpret a legislative text "as written" if
doing so would "lead to absurd consequences." See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9
(2006). I can think of nothing more absurd than a distinction without a reason.
Second, if NA 195, properly interpreted, does preclude the father's successors
from challenging the presumption of paternity that that article establishes, then
this aspect of the article should be immediately suppressed. Arbitrariness is one
of the great banes of legislative technique.
63. Glossa on as provided in Article 187. By virtue of this renvoi to NA
187, a subsequent-marrier/acknowledger, if he is to succeed in rebutting the
presumption that he is the child's father, (1) must prove that he is not the father
by "clear and convincing evidence," and (2) must put on more evidence than just
his own self-serving testimony. See supra note 26(b)(ii).
64. Glossa on a peremptive period . . . . Like the disavowal actions
established by NA 187 and NA 186, that established by NA 195 is subject to a
temporal limitation. But unlike the temporal limitations on those other
disavowal actions, which are prescriptive, see supra note 31(a), the temporal
limitation on the disavowal action of NA 195 is peremptive. For the
significance of this classification, see supra note 31 (a).
65. Glossa on one hundred eighty days. Another difference between the
temporal limitations on the disavowal actions established by NA 187 and NA
186, on the one hand, and that on the disavowal action established by NA 195,
on the other, lies in the length of the limitations period. Whereas the length of
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the period is one year in the case of a disavowal action brought under NA 187 or
NA 186, see NA 189 1, sentence 1; NA 186 2, the length of the period is
only half that long-180 days (about six months)-in the case of a disavowal
action brought under NA 195.
66. Glossa on the day of the marriage or the acknowledgment, whichever
occurs later. There is yet another difference between the temporal limitations
on NA 187 and NA 186 disavowal actions, on the one hand, and that on the NA
195 disavowal action, on the other: the triggering mechanism. For the NA 195
disavowal action, there is a unique alternative trigger: the 180-day period starts
to run upon the occurrence of the later of (1) the day on which the subsequent
marriage is celebrated, or (2) the day on which the subsequent-
marrier/acknowledger makes the acknowledgment.
Art. 200. Legitimation by No corresponding article
notarial act
67
A father or mother shall have
the power to legitimate his or her
illegitimate children by an act
passed before a notary and two
witnesses, declaring that it is the
intention of the parent making the
declaration to legitimate such
child or children.
67. Glossa on OA 200 "in toto." The institution of "legitimation by notarial
act" has been suppressed. As I explained earlier, one of the goals of the revisers
was to eliminate the historic subdivision of filiation into legitimate filiation and
illegitimate filiation. See supra note 7. The suppression of the various modes of
legitimating children born illegitimate was part of that larger project.
Art. 201. Legitimation of No corresponding article
deceased children
68
Legitimation may even be
extended to deceased children
who may have left issue, and in
that case it inures to the benefit of
such issue.
68. Glossa on OA 201 "in toto." OA 201, which permitted the legitimation
of deceased children, has been suppressed. For an explanation of why the
revisers decided to suppress it, see supra note 67.
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Art. 202. No corresponding article
Repealed by 1979 La. Acts
No. 60769
69. Glossa on OA 202 "in toto." This article had established two
subcategories of the illegitimate children category: (1) natural children, i.e.,
those who had been acknowledged by their fathers; and (2) bastards, i.e., those
who had not.
Art. 203. Methods of making
acknowledgment; legal effect
A. The acknowledgment of an
illegitimate child shall be made by
a declaration executed before a
notary public, in the presence of
two witnesses, by the father and
mother or either of them, or it
may be made in the registering of
the birth or baptism of such child.
B. (1) An acknowledgment or
declaration by notarial act is
deemed to be a legal finding of
paternity and is sufficient to
establish an obligation to support
an illegitimate child without the
necessity of obtaining a judgment
of paternity.
(2) An acknowledgment by
registry creates a presumption of
paternity which may be rebutted if
the alleged father proves by a
preponderance of the evidence
facts which reasonably indicate
that he is not the father, provided
such facts are susceptible of
independent verification or of
corroboration by physical data or
evidence.
70. Glossae on NA 196 "in toto."
Art. 196. Formal acknowledg-
ment; presumption
70
A man may, by authentic act
or by signing the birth
certificate, 7' acknowledge a child
not filiated to another man.72 The
acknowledgment creates a
presumption that the man who
acknowledges the child is the
father.73 The presumption can be
invoked only on behalf of the
child.74  Except as otherwise
provided in custody, visitation,
and child support cases,75 the
acknowledgment does not create a
presumption in favor of the man
who acknowledges the child.76
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a. Like OA 203, NA 196 permits a man, under certain circumstances, to
filiate a child to himself by means of "formal acknowledgment." To this extent,
NA 196 does not change the law.
Though the new law of formal acknowledgment has not been changed on
this point, it has been changed on a few others, as will be noted and explained in
the glossae that follow. These changes concern inter alia (1) the modes
whereby formal acknowledgment may be accomplished, and (2) the legal effects
of formal acknowledgment.
b. To appreciate fully the new law regarding the legal effects of formal
acknowledgment, one must recognize, at the outset, that NA 196 contains only
part of that law. The rest of that law has been relegated to the Civil Code
Ancillaries, in particular, Louisiana Revised Statutes Sections 9:392.1 and 405,
which read as follows:
§ 392.1. Acknowledgment; obligation to support; visitation
In child support, custody, and visitation cases, the
acknowledgment of paternity by authentic act is deemed to be a legal
finding of paternity and is sufficient to establish an obligation to
support the child and to establish visitation without the necessity of
obtaining a judgment of paternity.
§ 405. Legal effect of acknowledgment
In child support, custody, and visitation cases, the
acknowledgment of paternity by authentic act is deemed to be a legal
finding of paternity and is sufficient to establish an obligation to
support the child and to establish visitation without the necessity of
obtaining a judgment of paternity.
When one reads these two statutes alongside NA 196 and compares them in
their ensemble to OA 203, one discovers that the law regarding the legal effects
of formal acknowledgment has not been changed as profoundly as would appear
to be the case were one to read only NA 196 and compare it alone to OA 203.
For example, despite what NA 196, read in isolation, seems to suggest, the new
law has not eliminated the very important two-fold variation in effects that had
been established under the old law, namely, that in some circumstances and for
some purposes, a formal acknowledgment results in a "presumption" of
paternity and in others, a "legal finding" of paternity. To be sure, the new law
changes, albeit only slightly, these "circumstances" and these "purposes," as I
will explain shortly. But the two-fold variation in effects itself nevertheless
remains part of the new law.
71. Glossae on by authentic act or by signing the birth certificate.
a. OA 203 recognized three different modes of formal acknowledgment.
The acknowledger could (1) make out an authentic act of acknowledgment, (2)
sign the child's birth certificate, or (3) if the child was baptized, sign the
baptismal registry (as "father"). NA 196 changes the law by reducing the
permissible modes of formal acknowledgment to two: (1) making out a formal
act of acknowledgment; or (2) signing the child's birth certificate. Under NA
196, then, signing the baptismal registry no longer affects a formal
acknowledgment.
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b i. "Authentic act" as used in NA 196 (and in the rest of the new
legislation on filiation) has the meaning assigned to it in Louisiana Civil Code
article 1833.
ii. The "birth certificate" referred to here is that contemplated by
Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:3521. Pursuant to authority granted by
that statute, the Registrar of Vital Statistics has developed a birth certificate
form that, among other things, includes a signature line for the newborn's
"father."
72. Glossae on a child not filiated to another man.
a. The presumption created by NA 196 arises only if the child in question
is not already filiated to another man. This restriction on the scope of the
presumption changes the law or, at the very least, the established jurisprudential
interpretation of the law.
As OA 203 had been (mis)interpreted by the jurisprudence, the mode of
filiation established therein could operate not only in favor of a child who was
not yet filiated to another man, but also in favor of a child who was already
filiated to another man. See, e.g., Griffin v. Branch, 479 So. 2d 324, 328 (La.
1985) (implying that a man can, by formal acknowledgment, filiate a child to
himself even if that child is already filiated to, indeed, is the legitimate child of,
another man). In such a situation, the courts ruled, the child enjoyed dual
paternity, that is, had not one, but two, fathers.
Thanks to the insertion of the restriction "a child not filiated to another
man" into NA 196, it is no longer possible for formal acknowledgment to result
in dual paternity. Under this article, a man who acknowledges a child as his
own does not thereby filiate that child to himself. To the contrary, such a child
remains filiated to one and only one man-the man to whom the child had
theretofore been filiated.
b. Though NA 196 requires that the child not be "filiated to another man,"
the article does not specify when he must be so un-filiated, in particular, whether
it is necessary that he be un-filiated at the time of the acknowledgment or,
instead, whether it would suffice were he to become un-filiated after the
acknowledgment. This question parallels the question raised earlier, see supra
note 55(b), regarding NA 195. The conclusions I reached there are equally a
propos here. The timing of the child's being un-filiated to another man is a
matter of indifference under NA 196, so long as, at some point in time, the
child's being so un-filiated coincides with the existence of an acknowledgment.
Thus, whether the child is un-filiated to another man at the time of the
acknowledgment or, though filiated to another man at the time of the
acknowledgment, later becomes un-filiated to that man, the requirements of NA
196 are satisfied.
73. Glossae on [tihe acknowledgment creates a presumption that the man
who acknowledges the child is the father.
a. This part of NA 196 specifies the legal effect of a formal
acknowledgment: a presumption that the acknowledger is the child's father.
b. Though one would not know it from reading the text of NA 196, there
is, in fact, an exception to this effects-of-acknowledgment rule. This exception
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is signaled only in the texts of the new Civil Code Ancillaries that, together with
NA 196, make up the new law of the legal effects of formal acknowledgment,
namely, Louisiana Revised Statutes Sections 9:392.1 and 405. See supra note
70(b). The exception is this: that whereas a formal acknowledgment, as a
general rule, produces a "presumption of paternity," such an acknowledgment,
provided it is done by the making of an authentic act (as opposed to the signing
of a birth certificate), produces a "legal finding of paternity" in cases of child
support, custody, and visitation.
Though this distinction in effects between a presumption of paternity, on
the one hand, and a legal finding of paternity, on the other, is not new, see supra
note 70(b), the dividing line between those cases that produce one effect and
those that produce the other is new, at least in part. Under OA 203, the dividing
line was drawn simply in terms of modes of formal acknowledgment: if the
formal acknowledgment was done by authentic act, then the effect was a legal
finding of paternity; but if the formal acknowledgment was done by birth
certificate (or baptismal registry), then the effect was a presumption of paternity.
Under Louisiana Revised Statutes Sections 9:392.1 and 405, by contrast, the
dividing line, as we have seen, is drawn in terms that are rather more complex.
As before, the mode of formal acknowledgment is still relevant; but to that old
factor a new one has now been added, namely, the kind of case or, if one prefers,
the ultimate issue that is to be decided.
74. Glossa on [tihe presumption can be invoked only on behalf of the child.
Unlike the other presumptions of paternity established by the Revision, that
which arises from a formal acknowledgment, at least as a general rule, is relative
to the child: whereas the child can rely on it in his attempts to asserts rights
against the father (or the father's estate), the father cannot rely on it in his
attempts to assert rights against the child (or the child's estate). This
"relativization" of the presumption changes the law.
75. Glossae on [eixcept as otherwise provided in custody, visitation, and
child support cases ....
a. To the general rule that the presumption of paternity that arises from a
formal acknowledgment is relative to the child, NA 196 carves out a broad
exception, one so broad, in fact, that it comes close to swallowing up the general
rule: the presumption benefits the father no less than the child in any case in
which the ultimate issue to be decided is one of child custody, child visitation, or
child support. Thanks to this exception, the supposed general rule will, with few
exceptions, be operative in only two classes of cases: those in which the ultimate
issue to be decided is one of (1) succession rights, or (2) survival-
action/wrongful-death-action rights.
b. When one takes into account both the exceptional effects-of-
acknowledgment rule described in note 73(b) and that described in note 75(a),
one recognizes that cases of custody, visitation, and child support are doubly
exceptional. First, in such cases, the effect of a formal acknowledgment,
provided the acknowledgment is done by authentic act, is exceptional-a legal
finding of paternity rather than a presumption of paternity. Second, in such
cases, the beneficiaries of this effect, regardless of how the acknowledgment is
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done, are exceptional-the father as well as the child, rather than the child alone.
The end result of the interaction between these two exceptional rules and the
general rules to which they are related can be described as follows: (1) if the
formal acknowledgment was accomplished by the signing of a birth certificate,
then the acknowledgment produces a presumption of paternity, regardless of the
ultimate issue to be decided; (2) if the formal acknowledgment was
accomplished by making an authentic act, then the acknowledgment (a)
produces a legal finding of paternity in cases in which the ultimate issue to be
decided is one of custody, visitation, or support, or (b) a presumption of
paternity in all other cases.
76. Glossae on NA 196 "in toto."
a. Though the text of OA 203 did not expressly say so, the judges and
scholars who undertook to interpret that article unanimously concluded that a
false acknowledgment, that is, one made by a man who is not, in fact, the child's
biological father, could produce no effect. See, e.g., Succession of Robinson,
654 So. 2d 682, 684 (La. 1995); Linda A. Verlander, Comment, Succession of
Robinson: Clarification of Illegitimates' Succession Rights, 42 LoY. L. REv.
169, 176 (1996). In reaching this conclusion, these judges and scholars relied
upon the scholarship of French authors who have interpreted French Code Civil
article 334 (repealed), one of the sources of OA 203. See, e.g., Aubry & Rau,
supra note 1, at § 568, at 212 ("Intrinsic conditions for acknowledgment .... 4'
Truth-The acknowledgment must be the expression of the truth.... ."); Laurent,
supra note 1, No. 75, at 113 ("As a matter of law, an acknowledgment is non-
existent when it is made by him who is not the father .... As a matter of logic, no
one can create paternity which does not exist, save by way of adoption... ; thus,
if the acknowledgment is false, in can produce no effect .... ."). The argument
underlying this interpretation of OA 203 is, in large part, simply analytic: to
acknowledge something is, by definition, to admit that that something is true; it
follows, then, that an acknowledgment of that which is false is a logical
impossibility.
This interpretation of OA 203 must, in my judgment, be extended to NA
196. The logic behind the interpretation-that a false acknowledgment is a
contradiction in terms-is no less persuasive as applied to the new article than it
was as applied to the old. And there is no evidence whatsoever in the legislative
history (including the records of the Institute) that the revisers, when they
transformed OA 203 into NA 198, wished to repudiate this interpretation of the
former.
b. Unlike the new articles that pertain to the other presumptions of
paternity established by the Revision, NA 196 makes no provision for when the
presumption it creates must be challenged. According to comment (d) to NA
196, that variation between the other new articles, on the one hand, and NA 196,
on the other, is not an accident. The revisers understood that, in the absence of
any special stipulation regarding who may challenge the presumption, the
question would be decided by general principles. And the revisers judged,
correctly, that the general principle applicable to the "when" question is that the
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challenge may be brought at "any time." See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3457
(2006) ("There is no prescription other than that established by legislation.").
Art. 204. 77  No corresponding article
Repealed by 1979 La. Acts
No. 607
77. Glossa on OA 204 (1979) "in toto." This article had prohibited the
acknowledgment of children "whose parents were incapable of contracting
marriage at the time of conception." Inasmuch as the incapacities in question
included the impediments of a prior undissolved marriage and incest, the
principal effects of this prohibition included that so-called "adulterous bastards"
and "incestuous bastards" could never be acknowledged.
L
78. Glossa on OA 205 "in toto." OA 205 has been suppressed. That does
not mean, however, that the law has been changed. The proposition for which it
stood is consistent with general principles, so consistent, in fact, that one is
tempted to call it self-evident. The sole reason for suppressing the article, then,
was technical: to eliminate redundancy.
No corresponding articleArt. 205. Acknowledgment by
father alone
78
The acknowledgment made
by the father without the
concurrence or consent of the
mother, shall have effect only
with respect to the father.
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Art. 206. Rescission of notarial
act; with and without cause
79
A. A person who executed a
notarial act of acknowledgment or
declaration may, without cause,
rescind it before the earlier of:
(1) Sixty days of the signing
of the notarial act of
acknowledgment or declaration,
in a judicial proceeding for the
limited purpose of rescinding the
acknowledgment or declaration.
(2) A judicial hearing relating
to the child, including a child
support proceeding, wherein the
affiant to the notarial act of
acknowledgment or declaration is
a party to the proceeding.
B. At any time, a person who
executed a notarial act of
acknowledgment or declaration
may petition the court to void
such acknowledgment or
declaration only upon proof, by
clear and convincing evidence,
that such act was induced by
fraud, duress, or material mistake
of fact, or that the person is not
the biological parent of the child.
Except for good cause shown, the
court shall not suspend any legal
responsibilities or obligations,
including a support obligation, of
the person during the pendency of
this proceeding.
No corresponding article
79. Glossa on OA 206 "in toto." Though OA 206 has not been reproduced
in the form of a new Civil Code article, it has been reproduced in the form of a
new revised statute, namely, Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:406. This
new revised statute provides as follows:
§ 406. Revocation of authentic act; with and without cause
A. A person who executed a notarial act of acknowledgment
may, without cause, revoke it before the earlier of:
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(1) Sixty days of the signing of the notarial act of
acknowledgment, in a judicial proceeding for the limited purpose of
rescinding the acknowledgment or declaration.
(2) A judicial hearing relating to the child, including a child
support proceeding, wherein the affiant to the notarial act of
acknowledgment is a party to the proceeding.
B. At any time, a person who executed a notarial act of
acknowledgment or declaration may petition the court to rescind such
acknowledgment only upon proof, by clear and convincing evidence,
that such act was induced by fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact
or error, or that the person is not the biological parent of the child.
C. Except for good cause shown, the court shall not suspend during
the pendency of this proceeding any legal responsibilities or
obligations, including a support obligation, of the person who petitions
the court to revoke or rescind the authentic act of acknowledgment
under this Section.
Between the text of OA 206, on the one hand, and new section 406, on the
other, there are a number of variations. Here is a catalogue of the changes,
together with the reasons therefor:
Change Reason
1. In the rubric, "rescission" has To improve the accuracy of the
been replaced by "revocation." rubric: this change accommodates
one of the textual changes noted
below. (see infra #4)
2. In the rubric and throughout To improve technical precision:
the text, "notarial act" has been though the terms are often used
replaced by "authentic act." interchangeably, "authentic act" is
the preferred form.
3. Throughout the text, To improve technical quality: the
"acknowledgment or declaration" term "declaration" was redundant
has, with one curious exception of the term "acknowledgment."
(an oversight, perhaps?), been
abridged to "declaration."
4. In paragraph A, "rescind" To improve technical precision: to
and "rescinding" have been "rescind" is to upset some
replaced by "revoke" and juridical act for some "cause"; to
"revoking," respectively, upset a juridical act without cause
is to "revoke": what is
contemplated here is upsetting a
juridical act-acknowledgment
without cause.
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5. In paragraph B, "void" has To improve technical quality:
been replaced by "rescind." "void" is a "common law" term,
one that has no particular meaning
in Louisiana law; in the civil law,
"rescind" is a rough equivalent.
6. In paragraph B, "or error" To clarify: "material mistake of
has been added to "material fact" is a common law term, one
mistake of fact." that has no particular meaning in
Louisiana law; in the civil law,
"error" is a rough equivalent.
7. The final sentence of To improve technical quality: the
paragraph B of OA 206 has been rule set forth in the last sentence
set off in a separate paragraph (C) of OA 206 paragraph B was no
of new section 406. less connected to the rules of OA
206 paragraph A than it was to
that of OA 206 paragraph B, first
sentence.
As this chart makes clear, all of the changes to OA 206 that are reflected in
new section 406 fall under the heading of "stylistic" or "clarificatory." The
substance of OA 206, then, has not been changed.
80. Glossa on OA 207 "in toto." Though the revisers decided to suppress
OA 207, they did not, in so doing, understand themselves to be changing the
law. As that article had been interpreted by the courts, its chief function was to
enable anyone who had an interest in doing so to challenge the truth of a formal
acknowledgment made under OA 206. This same understanding of who, under
the new law, is entitled to challenge the truth of a formal acknowledgment finds
clear expression in comment (d) to NA 196, the pertinent part of which reads as
follows: "The presumption created by this Article must be distinguished from
the presumptions under Sections 1 and 2 of this Chapter. There is no similar
limitation in this Section as to who may bring the action to rebut the
presumption created by this Article."
How it is that the revisers believed they could suppress OA 207 and yet
leave the law the same is not difficult to fathom. The revisers understood that,
Art. 207. Contestation of claims
of acknowledged children
8 0
Every claim, set up by
illegitimate children, may be
contested by those who have any
interest therein.
439
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in the absence of any special stipulation regarding who may challenge the
presumption of NA 196, the question would be decided by general principles.
And the revisers judged that the general principle applicable to this "who"
question is the principle that any person may contest any assertion or
presumption of fact that adversely affects his "interest." This judgment, it bears
noting, finds support in French doctrine. See, e.g., Marcad6, supra note 1, No.
76, at 69 (noting that the rule of French Code Civil article 334 (repealed), a
source of OA 207, is "merely the application of the common law, of general
principles"); see also Laurent, supra note 1, No. 75, at 113 ("It [the rule of
French Code Civil article 339] is based on law and on reason. As a matter of
law, an acknowledgment is non-existent when it is made by him who is not the
father; now, every interested person can avail himself of the non-existence of a
juridical fact. As a matter of reason, no one can create paternity that does not
exist, save by way of adoption... ; thus, if the acknowledgment is false, it can
produce no effect to the prejudice of anyone and, as a result, any person can
repudiate it when it is opposed to him or attack it when he has an interest in
doing so."). For the revisers, then, suppressing OA 207, far from changing the
law, simply removed a redundancy from it.
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Art. 208. Requirement to prove fliation
In order to establish filiation, a child
who does not enjoy legitimate filiation or
who has not been filiated by the initiative
of the parent by legitimation or by
acknowledgment under Article 203 must
institute a proceeding under Article 209.
Art. 209. Proof of filiation
A. A child not entitled to legitimate
filiation nor filiated by the initiative of the
parent by legitimation or by
acknowledgment under Article 203 must
prove filiation as to an alleged living parent
by a preponderance of the evidence in a
civil proceeding instituted by the child or
on his behalf within the time limit provided
in this article.
B. A child not entitled to legitimate
filiation nor filiated by the initiative of the
parent by legitimation or by
acknowledgment under Article 203 must
prove filiation as to an alleged deceased
parent by clear and convincing evidence in
a civil proceeding instituted by the child or
on his behalf within the time limit provided
in this article.
C. The proceeding required by this
article must be brought within one year of
the death of the alleged parent or within
nineteen years of the child's birth,
whichever first occurs. This time
limitation shall run against all persons,
including minors and interdicts. If the
proceeding is not timely instituted, the
child may not thereafter establish his
filiation, except for the sole purpose of
establishing the right to recover damages
under Article 2315. A proceeding for that
purpose may be brought within one year of
the death of the alleged parent and may be
cumulated with the action to recover
damages.
D. The right to bring this proceeding
is heritable.
9
Art. 197.Child's action to establish
paternity; proof; time period8 l
A childn may institute an
action to prove paternity even though
he is presumed to be the child of
another man.83  If the action is
instituted after the death of the
alleged father, a child shall prove
paternity by clear and convincing
evidence.84
For purposes of succession
only,85 this action is subject to a
peremptive period' of one year.
7
This peremptive period commences
to run from the day of the death of
the alleged father.Y
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81. Glossa on NA 197 "in toto." NA 197 reproduces the substance of OAs
208 and 209, but with a number of modifications.
82. Glossa on [a] child .... If the child is an unemancipated minor, then he
lacks judicial capacity, and, for that reason, cannot bring the action on his own.
See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 683(A) (2006). In such a case, the action
will have to be brought on his behalf by his legal representative, namely, one of
his parents, if the child is subject to parental authority, see LA. Civ. CODE ANN.
art. 235 (2006); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 683(C), 4501-02 (2006), or his
tutor, if the child is not, see LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 683(B), 4262
(2006). Even so, it is the child himself, not his representative, who is the true
party plaintiff.
83. Glossa on even though he is presumed to be the child of another man.
As OAs 208 and 209 had been (mis)interpreted by the jurisprudence, the mode
of filiation established therein could operate not only in favor of a child who was
not yet filiated to another man, but also in favor of a child who was already
filiated to another man. See, e.g., Griffin v. Branch, 479 So. 2d 324, 328 (La.
1985) (holding that a child who is already filiated to one man may establish his
filiation to another man by means of an OA 209 filiation action). Were such an
action to be successful, the courts ruled, the child would enjoy dual paternity,
that is, would have not one, but two, fathers. This rule, notwithstanding how
manifestly inane it is in its conception and how mischievous it sometimes is in
its effects, has not been changed.
The blame for the retention of this bizarre rule rests squarely on the
shoulders of the Institute's Council. The Committee had proposed that this
instance of dual paternity, just like the others, see supra notes 55, 72, be
eliminated. In this one instance, however, the Institute's Council balked.
Lest I be misunderstood here, let me explain precisely why I find dual
paternity in this context to be so obnoxious. It is not because I believe that, once
a child is filiated to one man, he should forever thereafter be "stuck" with that
man and that man alone as his father. No, I am prepared to allow such a child, if
that man is not, in fact, his biological father and if that child has a mind to do so,
to attempt to establish his filiation to the man who is, in fact, his biological
father. What I find objectionable are the consequences that the law attaches to
such an attempt when it succeeds, in particular, that the child is allowed to
"keep" his old father in addition to his new one. In my judgment, this rule gives
the child a windfall that is neither logical nor prudent. I see no reason why such
a child should be able to eat his cake and have it too. Other children, notably,
those who have not been born of an adulterous liaison, must rest content with
having one and only one father. I fail to understand why a child who has been
born of such an ignominious union should be able to profit from it by getting an
extra father. What I would propose, then, is that the child who discovers that he
is filiated to the "wrong" man be given a choice to (1) stick with the one you
have and forget the other, or (2) filiate to the other and forget the one you have.
84. Glossae on [i]f the action is instituted after the death of the alleged
father, a child shall prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence.
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a. NA 197 leaves intact the standard of proof rules of OA 209. For cases
in which the alleged father has already died, NA 197 provides, as had OA 209,
that the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence, the intermediate
standard between that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. Though NA 197, in contrast to OA 209, does
not expressly provide that the standard of proof shall be proof by a
preponderance of the evidence in cases in which the alleged father is still alive,
there can be no doubt that that remains the law. By not specifying a standard of
proof rule for such cases, NA 197 allows them to fall under the scope of the
ordinary standard of proof rule, which requires proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.
b. The rationale behind the variation in the standard of proof as between
cases in which the father is still alive and those in which he is not is well-known.
As Professor Spaht has explained, "[a]fter the death of the alleged parent, whose
knowledge concerning the fact or probability of his filiation to the child is
superior [to that of all other persons], the [estate's] vulnerability to fraudulent
claims is significantly increased." Spaht, Developments, 1981-1982, supra note
1, at 537.
85. Glossa on for purposes of succession only . . . . Any and every
filiation action brought under OA 209, regardless of the kind of case in which it
was brought (regardless, in other words, of the ultimate issue that was to be
decided), was subject to a temporal limitation of one kind or another. Not so
under NA 197. This new article subjects the filiation action to a temporal
limitation in only one kind of case: that in which the ultimate issue to be decided
concerns the child's right to inherit from his alleged father. In other kinds of
cases, for example, where the ultimate issue to be decided concerns the child's
right to support from the alleged father or to collect damages for his father's
wrongful death, or the father's right to obtain custody of or to visit the child or
to collect damages for the child's wrongful death, the filiation action can now be
brought at any time.
86. Glossa on a peremptive period .... The temporal limitation established
by NA 197 is peremptive rather than prescriptive, just as were those established
by OA 209. See Talley v. Succession of Stuckey, 614 So. 2d 55 (La. 1993). For
the significance of this distinction, see supra note 31 (a).
87. Glossa on one year. The periods of the temporal limitations established
by OA 209 varied in length: in some instances, the length was one year; in
others, it was nineteen years. NA 197 simplifies the law by establishing one
single period the length of which is one year.
88. Glossa on [t]his peremptive period commences to run from the day of
the death of the alleged father. The trigger mechanism for the running of the
temporal limitations periods established by OA 209 was fairly complex: in some
instances (where the pertinent period was one year), the trigger was the date of
the alleged father's death; in others (where the pertinent period was nineteen
years), it was the date of the child's birth. NA 197 simplifies the law by
establishing a single trigger for all cases: the date of the alleged father's death.
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89. Glossa on OA 209(D) "in toto." This paragraph of OA 209, which
provided that the child's filiation action was heritable, has not been reproduced
in the Revision. There is some question regarding what, if any, significance one
should attribute to this legislative omission.
One might be tempted to think that the revisers intended to change the law,
that is, to render the child's filiation action non-heritable. When a legislature, in
the course of revising a body of law, reproduces some but not all of that law, it
is usually reasonable, at least where there's no evidence to the contrary, to
assume that the legislature wished to get rid of that part of the law that it
declined to reproduce.
But given the great magnitude of the change in question here-switching an
action from heritable to non-heritable---one has to suppose that, if the revisers
had really intended to make the change, someone, somewhere, sometime in the
larger legislative process (including the drafting of the Projet by the Institute)
would have said something about it. The trouble is that no one did. Nowhere in
the legislative record, including the records of the Institute, is there any
indication that it even occurred to anyone that the law on this point might be
changed, much less that anyone actively intended that such a change be made.
We find ourselves, then, in the face of a curiosity: legislative action that
seems to import a change in the law taken under circumstances in which no one
who had anything to do with that action believed any such change would occur.
How can this curiosity be explained? It is possible that the revisers believed (1)
that, by suppressing OA 209(D), the heritability vel non of the child's filiation
action would come to be governed by general principles, and (2) that under
those general principles, this action would be heritable. The first of these beliefs
is undoubtedly correct. Though the second belief may, perhaps, be questioned,
it at least has the support of some French doctrine, see, e.g., Laurent, supra note
1, No. 435, at 549 ("In general, all those who have an interest [therein] can bring
actions concerning the status of persons. That is the application of common
law."), and is arguably consistent with the principles that underlie Louisiana's
legislation regarding heritability. See LA. CrV. CODE ANN. art. 1765 2 (2006).
However that may be, the revisers' intent was clear enough. And that
intent, once again, was that the law not be changed. For that reason, my opinion
is that the child's filiation action remains heritable.
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Art. 191. Father's right to
establish paternity; time period
A. A man may establish his
paternity of a child presumed to
be the child of another man even
though the presumption has not
been rebutted.
B. This action shall be
instituted within two years from
the date of birth of the child,
except as may otherwise be
provided by law. Nonetheless, if
the mother in bad faith deceives
the father of the child regarding
his paternity, the action shall be
instituted within one year from
the date the father knew or should
have known of his paternity, but
no more than ten years from the
date of birth of the child.
Art. 198. Father's action to
establish paternity; time
period9°
A man may institute an action
to establish his paternity of a child
at any time91 except as provided
in this Article. 92 The action is
strictly personal.93
If the child is presumed to be
the child of another man,94 the
action shall be instituted within
one year from the day of the birth
of the child. 95 Nevertheless, if the
mother in bad faith deceived the
father of the child regarding his
paternity,96 the action shall be
instituted within one year from
the day the father knew or should
have known of his paternity, or
within ten years from the day of
the birth of the child, whichever
first occurs.
97
In all cases, the action shall
be instituted no later than one
year from the day of the death of
the child.98
The time periods in this
Article are peremptive. 99
90. Glossa on NA 198 "in toto." NA 198 reproduces the substance of OA
191, but with a number of modifications.
91. Glossa on at any time. In contrast to OA 191, which required that the
avowal action be brought within two years of the child's birth in all cases, NA
198 provides, as general rule, that the avowal action is not subject to any
temporal limitation.
92. Glossa on except as provided in this Article. To the general rule that an
avowal action may be brought at any time, see supra note 91, there are no
exceptions other than those established by NA 198. As we shall shortly see,
there are only two such exceptions. See infra notes 95(a), 98.
93. Glossa on [tihe action is strictly personal. The expression "strictly
personal," as used in NA 198 paragraph 2, has the same meaning assigned to it
in Louisiana Civil Code article 1766, which speaks of "strictly personal"
obligations. The implications of characterizing the disavowal action in this way
include that it is not heritable, so that it cannot be brought by the successors of
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the supposed father, and not transferable, so that it cannot be brought by his
creditors.
94. Glossa on [iJf the child is presumed to be the child of another man ....
The reference here is exclusively to the presumptions of paternity established in
the preceding new articles, namely, those of NA 185 (a presumption based on
marriage), NA 186 (another presumption based on marriage), NA 195 (a
presumption based on subsequent marriage plus formal acknowledgment), and
NA 196 (a presumption based on formal acknowledgment alone).
95. Glossae on [if the child is presumed to be the child of another man, the
action shall be instituted within one year from the day of the birth of the child.
a. In this the first sentence of NA 189 paragraph 2, we encounter the first
of the two exceptions to the general rule that an avowal action may be brought at
any time. This exception applies where the child, who is the target of the
avowal action, is already presumed to be the child of another man. In such a
case, the avowal action is subject to a short temporal limitation of one year.
And the trigger for the running of that period is the child's birth.
b. The rationale behind providing such a short time fuse for the avowal
action under these circumstances, such as it is, seems to run like this. Where the
child is presumed to be the child of another man, it will usually be because that
other man is the husband of the child's mother. If the child is still presumed to
be that man's child, that means that that man, at least for now, has not
disavowed paternity. And, if that is true, then chances are that that man, the
child's mother, and the child are still together, that the three of them form a still-
intact family. If another man is to be allowed to establish his filiation to such a
child, something that is likely to disrupt significantly, if not outright destroy, the
child's already-intact family, then that other man must, in the child's interest, be
required to act sooner rather than later. The longer the child remains in his
already-intact family, the more he will bond with his presumed father and,
consequently, the greater will be the psychological blow he will suffer when that
bond is weakened or broken.
If this is, in fact, the rationale that underlies the rule of NA 198 paragraph 2,
then the rule is open to objection on several scores. First, the rule is, in certain
respects, overly broad. Yes, it will usually be the case that when a certain man
is presumed to be the father of a certain child, it is because that man is married
to the mother. But that will not always be the case. A presumption of paternity,
as we have seen, can also arise from a mere acknowledgment, apart from any
marriage. See NA 196. Now, when the presumption arises from that cause, it
will not necessarily or even usually be the case that the presumed father, the
child's mother, and the child form an intact family. For that matter, even when
the presumption does arise from marriage, there is no guarantee that, at the time
the "real" father contemplates bringing a NA 198 action, the presumed father,
the mother, and the child will still form an intact family. Thus, as the rule is
written (it applies to any case in which there is any sort of presumed father), it
will end up being applied in many situations in which there is no intact family to
protect. Second, the rule is, in certain respects, overly restrictive. It is true that
the longer a child remains with a certain man whom he thinks is his father, the
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greater will be the bond that develops between them; however, the rate of this
bonding varies over time. When the child is young, the bonding takes place
slowly; as the child ages, the pace of bonding accelerates. For this reason, it is
unlikely that much additional bonding beyond what has already taken place in
the first year will occur in the second year or even the third or perhaps even the
fourth. And, if that is so, it might be possible to disrupt or even sever the bond
between the child and his first father as late as the child's second or third or
maybe even fourth birthday without thereby doing him much psychological
damage. (It is, in fact, precisely for this reason that the "old" Uniform Parentage
Act accorded the would-be avower five years within which to bring his action if
the child in question is part of an intact family. See UNEF. PARENTAGE ACT §
6(a), 9 U.L.A. 410-11 (1973)). Thus, as the rule is written (it imposes a
peremptive period of only one year), it will foreclose the avowal action in cases
in which it could be brought without much, if any, harm to the child.
Looking at the "disconnects" between the rule of NA 198 paragraph 2, on
the one hand, and the rationale that has been offered in support of it, on the
other, one might begin to wonder if that rationale is genuine, or if, in fact, there
is not something else going on here that explains how the rule came to be. This
speculation, it turns out, is justified. The rule of NA 198 paragraph 2 is the
result of a compromise, worked out by the Institute, between the proponents of
two opposing points of view. First, some within the Institute were, indeed,
committed to the notion that intact families should be protected against the
disruptive effects of avowal actions. To this end, they proposed that the avowal
action be entirely foreclosed when the child who is its target is part of such a
family, for as long as he remains a part of such a family. Second, others within
the Institute cared far less (if at all) about protecting intact families against the
risk of disruption than they did about protecting the would-be avower against the
risk of being cut off from his child. To this end, they proposed that the avowal
action be permitted under all circumstances, even when the child who is its
target is part of an intact family, and, further, proposed that this action not be
subjected to any temporal limitation. By allowing the would-be avower to avow
even when the child is part of an intact family, the compromisers "threw a bone"
to the second group; by attaching a short time fuse to such a would-be avower's
avowal action, they "threw another bone" to the first group. Both groups were
content to take what they could get.
This explanation of "what is really going on here," I recognize, leaves
unexplained why, in the compromise, the prerequisite for the application of the
short peremptive period was cast not in terms such as "if the child, his mother,
and his presumed father form an intact family," but rather in the terms "if the
child is presumed to be the child of another man." For this, I am afraid, I have
no explanation.
96. Glossa on [nJevertheless, if the mother in bad faith deceived the father
of the child regarding his paternity . . . . The second sentence of OA 191
paragraph B carved out an exception to the general temporal-limitation rule for
the avowal action based on the mother's "bad faith deception" of the father
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regarding the child's paternity. NA 198 paragraph 2 reproduces the substance of
that exception, albeit in somewhat different form.
97. Glossa on the action shall be instituted within one year from the day the
father knew or should have known of his paternity, or within ten years from the
day of the birth of the child, whichever first occurs. Like OA 191(B), NA 198
paragraph 2 requires that the avowal action be brought by the earlier of (1) one
year, reckoning from the date on which the supposed father gains actual or
constructive knowledge of the child's birth, or (2) ten years, reckoning from the
date of the child's birth. On this point the law remains unchanged.
98. Glossa on [i]n all cases, the action shall be instituted no later than one
year from the day of the death of the child. In this, the penultimate paragraph of
NA 198, we encounter the second exception to the general rule that an avowal
action may be brought at any time. This exception applies where the child, who
is the target of the avowal action, has already died. In such a case, the action is
subject to a temporal limitation of one year. And the trigger for the running of
this period is the child's death.
99. Glossa on [tihe time periods in this article are peremptive. Though OA
191 was less than clear regarding the nature of the temporal limitation that it
imposed on the avowal action-whether the limitation was peremptive or
prescriptive-the jurisprudence resolved the issue in favor of the former
alternative. See W.R.M. v. H.C.V., 923 So. 2d 911, 914 (La. App. 3d Cir.
2006); Mouret v. Godeau, 886 So. 2d 1217, 1221 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004). NA
198 paragraph 4 expressly provides that the same is true of the temporal
limitations established in NA 198 paragraphs 2 and 3. In this regard, then, the
law has not been changed.
Art. 210.100 No corresponding article
Repealed by 1980 La. Acts
No. 549
100. Glossa on OA 210 "in toto." This article provided that the testimony of
the mother to the effect that her cohabitor was the child's father was not
sufficient to establish paternity in an action brought under OA 209 where it
could be proved that the mother was sexually promiscuous; specifically, that the
mother was "a woman of dissolute manners or ... had an unlawful connection
with one or more men" other than her cohabitor.
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101. Glossa on OA 211 "in toto." This article, which established a special
rule of filiation for the case in which a child is born following a rape, has been
suppressed. Now filiation in such cases must be sorted out on the basis of the
standard rules of filiation.
Art. 212. 102 No corresponding article
Repealed by 1980 La. Acts
No. 549
102. Glossa on OA 212 "in toto." This article authorized illegitimate
children to "make proof of their maternal descent, provided the mother be not a
married woman."
Art. 213.'0' No corresponding article
Repealed by 1948 La. Acts
No. 227
103. Glossa on OA 213 (1948) "in toto." This article prohibited the parents
of a "foundling" who had been reared by strangers from claiming him as their
own, except upon proof that he had been taken from them "by force, fraud, or
accident."
No corresponding articleArt. 211. Proof of paternity in
case of rape'0'
In case of rape, whenever the
time of such rape shall agree with
the time of conception, the
ravisher may, at the suit of the
parties concerned, be declared to
be the father of the child.
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